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Foreword by the chief executive of UksIF
I hope that this timely report will act as a wake-up call to trustees to put climate change, resource efficiency and social 
sustainability at the heart of their investment practices.
Pension funds need an economic recovery that lasts. To achieve this, they must take greater responsibility as asset 
owners for creating a low carbon, resource efficient and socially sustainable world.
Specifically, trustees need to integrate sustainability issues fully into their pension fund governance role. This is about 
investment beliefs and improved contractual relationships, not about usurping the roles of investment consultants or 
fund managers. Quality of responsible investment must become a significant factor in the awarding and retaining of 
mandates. Specialist support is now available from the major investment consultancies. Asset managers have increasing 
capacity to deliver responsible investment practices; but the most experienced recognise that current contractual 
obligations can prevent the longer-term approach required by the fiduciary requirements of their clients.
Climate change is probably the most significant of the range of social and environmental issues that will cause 
cataclysmic change to wealth generation opportunities over coming decades. Even more significantly for pension fund 
trustees, public policy responses to reduce carbon emissions should move that impact forward into the next few years.
The size and extent of the recent financial and economic crisis was almost unimaginable to most people before it rapidly 
took hold and yet, in retrospect, the dangers of the culture and practices that prevailed seem clear. It can similarly be 
difficult to accept, in spite of the mounting evidence, that rapid or discontinuous change will happen as a result of climate 
change. But there can be no real excuses if pension fund trustees do not learn from their new experience.
The conclusions of this research demonstrate what has long been known anecdotally – that, with certain notable 
exceptions, pension fund trustees are not driving the change needed to ensure that the finance sector protects future 
wealth generation and quality of life.
As the report highlights and government ministers and regulators are increasingly emphasising, this is part of a wider 
problem of lack of accountability by pension fund trustees for behaviours in the investment supply chain between them 
as beneficial owners of capital on the one hand and the users of that capital on the other. As Donald MacDonald, chair of 
the board of the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment Initiative (PRI), has said about the financial 
crisis: ‘As clients and part owners of the financial institutions at the core of this crisis, institutional investors should 
accept some shared responsibility for the behaviours that led to the crisis’.
Earlier this year, the government chief scientific adviser, Professor John Beddington predicted a ‘perfect storm’ of food 
shortages, water scarcity and insufficient energy as early as 2030 – a date that should be well within the planning 
horizon for most fiduciaries. He anticipated that these would lead to social upheaval and be exacerbated by 
unpredictable impacts from climate change.
I therefore commend this important research report to you. Its conclusions demand urgent action.
It is increasingly clear that the ability to meet pension fund liabilities will be under ever more threat unless pension fund 
trustees adopt more sustainable investment practices. Most importantly, so will the prosperity and well-being of both 
pension fund beneficiaries and wider society.
Penny Shepherd MBE
Chief Executive
UKSIF – the sustainable investment and finance association
6We are beginning to realise the potential magnitude of impact from climate change – not only on the natural 
environment, but also on human society as a whole. It seems clear that the question is no longer whether climate change 
will affect society, but rather how much. In order to answer this question, the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) is funding a number of research initiatives on environmental change and society. This report, funded by ESRC 
and ACCA, looks into climate change impact on pension fund performance – and how this goes largely unrecognised.
Climate change has already been identified as an important issue for financial investment strategy, with industry experts 
expecting it to have a material impact on investment performance over the next five years. One example is knock-on 
effects from extreme weather events on increased risks and costs for the insurance industry, as highlighted by the Stern 
Review.
From a purely financial point of view, it therefore makes sense to identify how climate change will affect business, not 
least for pension funds looking to maximise return on investment over a number of years. The case is even stronger from 
an ethical viewpoint, in terms of ensuring that investment is socially responsible. As this report points out, pension fund 
trustees are in a unique position to affect corporate behaviour. Pension funds are major shareholders in UK companies, 
empowering trustees to wield significant influence in strategic decisions.
It is a potential which so far has been largely untapped. The survey shows that pension fund trustees generally are little 
aware of how climate change can affect the performance of pension funds, or how much fund managers’ strategic 
decisions reflect responsible investment regarding climate change. It has uncovered a lack of accountability and 
governance between trustees, fund managers and fund members.
The study provides an invaluable insight into pension fund trustees’ attitudes and investment priorities. It illustrates how 
pension funds can realise their strategic shareholder potential – not only in terms of climate change impacts, but also for 
the broader issue of best practice in governance and accountability.
Ian Diamond 
Chief Executive 
Economic and Social Research Council
Foreword by the chief executive of esRC
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executive summary
This study also carries broader implications for pension 
fund governance and accountability. One of the most 
significant outcomes of the research was evidence of 
weakness in accountability chains between trustees and 
fund managers, trustees and members, and trustees and 
the sponsor companies. Although we focused specifically 
on climate change issues, the interviews indicated that the 
lack of accountability and governance was not limited to 
the issue of climate change but applied to all areas of 
socially responsible investment (SRI). Despite the 
increasingly close focus of the institutional investment 
community on ESG factors, trustees were not engaging 
with their fund managers or their pension fund members 
on their SRI policy. Even the leaders among our sample 
acknowledged a lack of communication in these areas. 
There is an evident lack of accountability and governance 
between the various intermediaries involved in pension 
fund investment, which contrasts starkly with the highly 
developed accountability chains between companies and 
their shareholders/stakeholders through social and 
environmental reporting (SER).
As a result of these findings we make recommendations on 
two levels. First, on a theoretical and academic level, we 
suggest that there is an urgent need for further research 
into the accountability and governance links between the 
intermediaries involved in pension fund investment, 
specifically between trustees and their pension fund 
members, fund managers and their sponsor companies.
Second, on a practitioner level, there is an urgent need for 
a code of practice, or at least a set of principles 
representing best practice in accountability and 
governance for the pension fund community, in relation to 
climate change specifically but also emphasising other 
extra-financial issues. The Myners principles, although 
representing an important improvement to pension fund 
governance, did not focus on ESG accountability within the 
trustee community. Myners illuminated trustees’ lack of 
expertise across all areas of trusteeship. The broader, 
‘soft’, qualitative issues covered by ESG investment require 
attention by trustees and other members of the pension 
fund community. In the broader context, if trustees lack 
expertise in mainstream financial investment, their lack of 
specific knowledge about climate change risks and 
opportunities is not surprising. A code of best practice on 
governance and accountability aimed at trustees would 
help to resolve this situation. A code of best practice on 
climate change, produced with government backing as a 
mainstream policy document for trustees, is suggested as 
a means of forcing trustees to address the material issues 
of climate change seriously and urgently.
Pensions are among the most significant consumer 
products and investments purchased by society. 
Protecting pensions against material financial risk is 
crucial to the maximisation of social welfare. There is a 
substantial and growing practitioner and policy-driven 
literature on the relevance of climate change to 
institutional investment, calling for pension fund trustees 
to incorporate it into their investment strategy decisions. 
Trustees are in a unique position, with significant power to 
affect corporate behaviour through the strategy they 
implement in their pension funds, as pension funds own 
the largest proportion of shares in UK listed companies. 
We therefore investigated trustees’ attitudes towards their 
role and responsibilities in relation to climate change, to 
discover whether they are harnessing their power to effect 
change. This report summarises the views of 20 
interviewees, in order to explore some of the emerging 
themes. The findings suggest a substantial gap between 
theory (in terms of recommendations from the literature) 
and trustee practice regarding climate change. 
This study is the first to address trustees’ attitudes 
towards climate change and its potential impact on 
pension fund investment. Further, it represents a first 
attempt to gather interview evidence on trustees’ views. 
The findings of the full study provide rich, in-depth 
evidence about trustees’ attitudes towards their role and 
responsibilities regarding climate change. 
Interviewees indicated that climate change did not 
generally feature on the agenda of their trustee meetings 
and that they considered it to be a relatively unimportant 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factor. 
Trustees interviewed were generally unaware of their fund 
managers’ activities concerning climate change and 
displayed a low level of accountability to their members in 
relation to this subject, rarely engaging with members on 
their responsible investment policy. Although most of our 
interviewees said that climate change could be a material 
issue for their funds, their understanding of how it could 
affect shareholder value and financial return was partial.
One salient outcome of the research process was that 
trustees recognised an urgent need to improve their 
knowledge and understanding of climate change issues 
and the way in which they can affect pension fund 
performance. They acknowledged their (unrealised) 
potential in affecting corporate behaviour through their 
actions relating to climate change. The interviewees 
suggested that the interview process itself would incite 
them to consider climate change in a more active manner. 
They also made a series of suggestions as to how they 
intended to change their behaviour accordingly.
We also found evidence of a significant size factor in our 
interviews, as trustees from the larger funds were more 
aware of the connection between climate change and 
financial return, and were generally more knowledgeable 
about the relevance of ESG issues to pension fund 
investment.
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The most recent science says climate change will go 
further and faster. We are closer to the thresholds than 
we thought…what we do now could determine the fate of 
billions of people. These could be the most important 
years in history. (Forum for the Future 2008: 70)
The need for the financial services industry to discharge 
accountability to society and to behave ethically has been 
highlighted in recent years. Scandals such as Barings, and 
the more recent focus on unethical activity within the 
banking sector, have forced ethics and accountability 
within financial services into the limelight. It is becoming 
increasingly evident that the current global financial crisis 
clearly has its roots in weak governance practices and low 
levels of ethical behaviour and accountability. In the 
pension fund industry, the role of the pension fund trustee 
has been scrutinised intensely since the turn of the 
century as trustees have been identified as passive and 
lacking in the necessary skills to carry out their role 
(Myners 2001; Myners 2004; NAPF 2007). As a result, 
trustees’ responsibilities have been established more 
explicitly and their role formalised. Climate change is one 
of the many issues growing in relevance for pension funds 
and their trustees. The extent to which trustees are 
embracing this aspect of their role has been little 
researched and this report contributes to the existing 
literature by providing evidence about their attitudes 
towards their role and responsibilities regarding climate 
change.
Climate change has been catapulted into the centre of the 
global stage by a series of significant reports from the 
United Nations Working Party and the UK government 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007; 
Stern 2006). There is now consensus among the scientific 
community that human intervention, especially business 
activity, has caused global warming, with carbon emissions 
from the burning of fossil fuels since the industrial 
revolution heating the atmosphere. The IPCC, established 
in 1988, estimated that by the end of the 21st century, 
global temperatures will have risen by between 1.5 and 5.8 
degrees centigrade. As a result, they predicted changes 
such as the thawing of permafrost, declines in biodiversity, 
rising sea levels and extreme weather patterns. These 
events will lead to flooding, droughts and storms, which 
will have direct, unpredictable and possibly devastating 
consequences on human civilisation. The most recent 
scientific research suggests that climate change is 
occurring far more quickly than previously anticipated, 
shifting the risks associated with climate change from the 
longer-term to the short-to-medium-term future.
Climate change will affect (and is already affecting) the 
financial services industry and is an important factor in 
socially responsible investment (SRI). The consideration of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in 
institutional investment, which include climate change, is 
moving quickly into the mainstream (Friedman and Miles 
2001; Solomon and Solomon 2006; Solomon 2007; 
Sparkes 2002). Indeed, a survey of fund managers around 
the world found that 70% believed the integration of social, 
ethical and environmental (SEE) factors into investment 
analysis would become mainstream in investment 
management in the following three to ten years. The 
survey also found that 60% of fund managers consider 
that screening for social, ethical and environmental factors 
would be mainstream in the following three to ten years 
(Ambachtsheer 2005). Further, SRI is continuing to expand 
at a global level, spurred on by an anticipated increased 
client demand for the integration of ESG analysis in 
mainstream institutional investment (Mercer Investment 
Consulting 2006).
Climate change has been identified as a central issue for 
institutional investment strategy (Mercer Investment 
Consulting 2006). Mercer’s survey shows that a high 
proportion of fund managers expected climate change 
would have a material impact on investment performance. 
The Stern Review (Stern 2006) makes reference to the 
need for the financial services industry to respond to the 
potential negative impacts of climate change. ‘The 
insurance sector will face both higher risks and broader 
opportunities, but will require much greater access to 
long-term capital funding to be able to underwrite the 
increased risks and costs of extreme weather events’ 
(Stern 2006: 304; see also Ceres 2006).
Climate change has also been identified as an important 
issue for pension fund trustees (Carbon Trust 2005, 
2006). We discuss the links between pension fund 
financial performance and climate change in more detail 
in the following section.
This research aims to investigate the attitudes of trustees 
towards their role and responsibilities in relation to climate 
change. Our findings should contribute significantly to 
current knowledge in a number of ways. First, this is the 
first research project addressing trustees’ attitudes 
towards climate change, as a specific ESG issue. Second, 
the research uses interview methodology, in order to 
provide rich in-depth data on trustees’ attitudes, whereas 
previous studies have implemented questionnaires. Third, 
the trustees targeted are from companies listed on the 
London Stock Exchange, and are therefore not biased 
towards high performers in corporate social responsibility, 
or the public sector. This means that the results should 
represent trustee practice and attitudes across the 
corporate pension fund community. Chapter 2 
summarises the extant literature and policy documents 
relating to the role of pension fund trustees in climate 
change and to SRI more generally. Chapter 3 outlines the 
interview research methodology applied in this study. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of a thematic analysis of 
the interview data. The report concludes with a discussion 
in Chapter 5.
1. Introduction
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Trustees have been under pressure to expand the remit of 
their responsibilities and to improve the manner in which 
they deal with these responsibilities. The Myners Report 
(Myners 2001) examines the responsibilities of trustees 
and recommends that they adopt a voluntary set of 
principles to improve pension fund governance and 
investment decision making.1 A review was undertaken in 
2003–4 to assess the extent to which the Myners 
principles had resulted in behavioural change within the 
trustee (and broader institutional investment) community 
– The Myners Review (Myners 2004). This review revealed 
substantial improvements, with over half of the trustees 
surveyed formalising previously ad hoc behaviour, with 
trustees appearing better informed and addressing issues 
they would perhaps have bypassed before Myners (2001). 
Nonetheless, the review also highlighted some continuing 
problems. Specifically, trustees’ skills and expertise had 
not improved significantly; there was a continuing lack of 
clarity regarding the trustee’s role; insufficient resources 
were being devoted to asset allocation decisions; there was 
a continuing mismatch in perception between trustees and 
fund managers over investment time horizons; there was 
insufficient promotion of shareholder engagement; and 
inadequate commentary on progress in implementing the 
Myners principles (2001). A report by the NAPF (2007) 
also reassesses the success of trustees in dealing with 
their many responsibilities. Although the report 
acknowledges significant progress in trustees’ adoption of 
the principles, especially in the area of trustee knowledge 
and understanding, it still indicates areas of concern, 
especially in relation to trustees’ assessment of their own 
performance. Although Myners (2001), Myners (2004) and 
the NAPF report (2007) do not mention climate change 
issues in relation to the trustees’ role, other reports have 
identified them as a rapidly evolving area for trustee 
concern, as we see below.
Climate change has been forced to the top of the agenda 
among ESG considerations, in light of recent 
developments. The Stern Review (Stern 2006) and the final 
conclusions of detailed research by the United Nations 
(IPCC 2007) have abruptly moved climate change issues 
to the forefront of international public policy and onto 
global political agendas. Below, the findings of extant 
research and professional reports are summarised, with 
respect to the role of trustees in SRI, and more specifically, 
consideration of climate change in pension fund 
investment.
1. Specifically, the Myners principles recommend that, in 
relation to pension fund trustees: trustee boards should ensure 
they have access to appropriate skills and resources; decisions 
should be taken only by those trustees with adequate skills and 
expertise; trustees should engage with investee companies where 
it is in the interests of their fund members to do so; and the SIP 
should report annually to stakeholders on the fund’s investment 
strategy and returns.
soCIAlly ResPonsIble InvesTmenT: FRom mARgIn 
To mAInsTReAm
Since the start of the 21st century, SRI has 
metamorphosed from a marginal issue into a 
consideration in mainstream institutional investment 
(Mansley 2000; Solomon and Solomon 2006; Solomon 
2007). One of the principal reasons for this shift from 
margin to mainstream has been the change in approach to 
SRI from a strategy of screening to a strategy of 
engagement and dialogue with companies on SEE issues. 
Another reason for the more integrated approach towards 
SRI has been its linkage to corporate governance, as 
evidenced by a change in terminology from ‘SRI’ to 
‘consideration of ESG factors’ in institutional investment. 
This represents not simply a change in terminology but a 
deep-seated shift in attitude, with the recognition of the 
importance of equating SEE issues with issues such as 
board performance and remuneration (Solomon 2007). 
Drivers for SRI have come from external lobby groups as 
well as from pension fund members and society as a 
whole (Solomon et al. 2002).
PensIon FUnds, TRUsTees, soCIAlly ResPonsIble 
InvesTmenT And envIRonmenTAl, soCIAl And 
goveRnAnCe FACToRs
The need for institutional investors to embrace a socially 
responsible role has been acknowledged (Monks 2001). 
There has been a growing demand from pension fund 
members for their funds to adopt an SRI policy, provided 
that it does not compromise financial returns (EIRIS 1999; 
Targett 2000). A change to pension fund law in 2001, 
forcing all pension funds to disclose in their Statement of 
Investment Principles (SIP) the extent to which, if at all, 
they adopt an SRI policy, shone a spotlight on the social 
accountability of pension funds. A report published around 
the same time comments that the new disclosure 
requirement would be likely to cause a number of major 
pension funds to require their fund managers to place 
greater emphasis on these issues (ACCA 2000). These 
predictions were correct in that the majority of trustees 
incorporated reference to SEE issues in their annual 
statements in 2001 (Cowe 2001: 8). Indeed, Mathieu 
(2000) shows that over half of all pension funds had 
incorporated SRI factors into their investment decisions as 
a result of the amendment to pension fund law. Similarly, 
following the amendment to UK pension fund law, a 
number of countries followed suit (Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer 2005). 
There have been extensive efforts at an international level 
to promote SRI with the launch of the Principles for 
Responsible Investment by the United Nations. 
Approximately 360 institutions have signed up to these 
principles, representing in excess of US$14 trillion in 
assets (UNEP 2008). Climate change disclosure and 
performance, sustainability disclosure and biodiversity 
have been among the ESG areas where signatories to the 
principles have focused their engagement with investee 
2. Climate change and trustees
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companies. Similarly, the London Accord2 has been 
instrumental in raising the profile of ESG issues, and the 
activities of the institutional investment community 
regarding climate change and other ESG matters, within 
the wider business communities.
Despite these significant changes, the fiduciary 
responsibility of trustees to maximise return to their 
members has been used as an excuse for not adopting 
SRI. Under the rubric of ‘fiduciary duty’ much is justified. 
The unexceptionable fiduciary requirement that trustees may 
consider ‘solely’ the interests of beneficiaries is adduced to 
justify non-involvement in ‘social’ or ‘political’ investments. 
Activism is dismissed as being unrelated to adding long-
term value to the trust portfolio (Monks 2001: 125). 
Institutional investors have also avoided SRI, believing ESG 
factors to be unquantifiable and incapable of being 
incorporated into investment analysis. This view is now 
acknowledged as outdated, however, as:
it is increasingly difficult for investment decision-makers 
to claim that ESG [environmental, social and governance] 
considerations are too difficult to quantify when they readily 
quantify business goodwill and other equivalently nebulous 
intangibles (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005: 11).
The ‘Freshfields Report’ (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 
2005) provided groundbreaking evidence that trustees 
should not only be taking account of ESG issues in their 
investment strategy decisions, but that they are in breach 
of their fiduciary duty if they do not. The study aimed to 
dispel the all-too-common misunderstanding that fiduciary 
responsibility is restricted by law, in a narrow sense, such 
that SRI cannot be pursued. The report explained two 
cases where ESG considerations must be included as part 
of a pension fund’s fiduciary responsibilities: when there is 
a consensus among the fund beneficiaries that ESG factors 
should be taken into account, and where ESG 
considerations are reasonably expected to have a material 
impact on the financial performance of the investment. 
Failure in either of these cases to incorporate such factors 
into the investment strategy would represent a breach in 
fiduciary duty. This approach alters the whole view of SRI.
One of the few studies of trustees’ views towards SRI, 
conducted immediately following the introduction of the 
SIP disclosure requirement, found evidence of confusion 
among the trustee community (Solomon and Solomon 
2003).3 The research involved a questionnaire survey 
2.  The London Accord is a cooperative project which seeks to 
disseminate the thinking of the institutional investment 
community to a broader audience by producing reports on issues 
such as climate change and financial services.
3.  The study involved an extensive questionnaire survey 
distributed to trustees from the entire population of pension 
funds that were members of the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF), ie 891 organisations. There was a total response 
rate of 18%. Over three-quarters of the respondents were from 
private-sector pension funds.
distributed to an extensive sample of trustees. They were 
generally uncertain about their role in SRI and were 
concerned that pursuing an SRI strategy might conflict 
with their fiduciary duties. The report contrasts the 
trustees’ attitudes with the views of pension fund directors, 
and other leading members of the institutional investment 
community, who were surprised at trustees’ lack of interest 
in SRI and their unwillingness to debate SRI policy. The 
research reflects the general uncertainty within the 
financial community regarding trustees’ fiduciary duty 
and SRI.
TRUsTees And ClImATe ChAnge, And TheIR 
PoTenTIAl To InFlUenCe CoRPoRATe behAvIoUR
In 2005, three organisations collaborated to produce a 
report to guide pension fund trustees in understanding 
and addressing risks associated with climate change.4 The 
report’s aim was to raise awareness among trustees about 
climate change and their fiduciary duty. It was also 
intended to show trustees how to address climate change 
in their investment strategy decisions (Carbon Trust 2005). 
Pension funds are the largest and most influential group of 
institutional investors in the UK. Furthermore, exposure of 
UK pension funds to investment in corporations has been 
estimated at 72.5%.5 If companies are affected by climate 
change then so are pension funds. Conservative estimates 
suggest that up to 5.1% of market capitalisation could be 
at risk from the consequences of climate change, with less 
conservative estimates suggesting figures up to ten times 
higher (Carbon Trust 2005). 
The potential for trustees to engage with companies and 
influence their behaviour is acknowledged (Cadbury 
1992; Hampel 1998). Therefore, if climate change is 
raised as an issue for pension funds, there is a need for it 
to be integrated into investment strategy. Trustees advise 
the pension fund managers they appoint who then 
engage with companies, and corporate behaviour in 
relation to climate change will alter: ‘Considering that 
both the physical and mitigation-related policy impacts of 
climate change will influence the ability for companies to 
create and maintain wealth for shareholders…pension 
trustees will want to ensure that these risks…are being 
4.  A group of organisations collaborated in 2005 to produce this 
report into trustees’ duties and climate change, namely the 
Carbon Trust, Mercer Investment Consulting and the Institutional 
Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC). The Carbon Trust is 
an independent not-for-profit company established by the UK 
government to lead low-carbon technology and innovation within 
the public and private sectors in the UK. Mercer Investment 
Consulting is a leading global provider of investment consulting 
services. It is dedicated to developing intellectual capital related 
to socially responsible investment and the integration of ESG 
factors into investment processes. The IIGCC is a forum for 
collaboration between pension funds and other institutional 
investors on issues relating to climate change.
5.  This arises from direct investment in listed company shares 
but also through investment in corporate bonds (see Carbon 
Trust 2005).
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pension fund representatives about trustees’ views8 and 
revealed information about the role of trustees in 
responsible investment and climate change. For example, 
the survey indicated that one-fifth of trustees from the 
pension funds surveyed were thought to be aware of three 
climate change initiatives: The Stern Review (Stern 2006), 
the United Nations Principles of Responsible Investment, 
and the United Nations Environment Programme Finance 
Initiative. Further, the study found that one-third 
considered their trustees were aware of at least two of 
them. 
On ESG considerations more generally, the survey found 
that representatives from two out of three corporate 
pension funds surveyed thought they had trustees who 
believed that ESG issues could have a material impact on 
their funds’ investments in the long term. These findings 
indicate a broad knowledge base among the trustee 
community and a strong interest in climate change and 
ESG issues generally. Nevertheless it is notable that the 
sponsor companies were CSR leaders.
Overall, earlier studies examining the level of proactiveness 
on climate change within the financial services industry 
have produced disappointing results, with a number of 
barriers to engagement being identified. For example, one 
study found that earlier engagement with climate change 
within the financial sector was being prevented by (inter 
alia):9
the view that climate change is marginal to corporate •	
financial performance
a sense of shared responsibility that deters one group •	
from taking the initiative
the lack of understanding of the connection between •	
climate change and financial risk, with a corresponding 
lack of monetary value being perceived in action on 
climate change
the provision of insufficient analysis and information by •	
key financial and insurance sector advisers
poor data availability, which renders analysis of •	
potential company risks difficult.
As the data for this study were gathered over five years 
ago, it may be hoped that some of these barriers have 
since been overcome among the trustee community.
Another report considers whether the debate on climate 
change has affected institutional investors’ behaviour. This 
report, commissioned by the HeadLand Consultancy 
8.  The survey resulted in 33 usable responses from pension 
fund contacts for companies listed in the FTSE4Good UK Index 
and in the Carbon Disclosure Project’s Climate Leadership Index.
9.  This study was the UNEP Finance Initiative’s CEO Briefing on 
Climate Change (2003) quoted in Carbon Trust (2005).
addressed in relation to the funds in their care’ (IPCC 2007).
The risks arising from climate change fall into five general 
categories: regulatory risk, physical risk, litigation risk, 
competitiveness risk and reputational risk.6 As a result, the 
Carbon Trust report (2005) advises trustees to: 
assess their understanding of climate change risk and •	
determine whether or not it could have a material 
impact on their pension fund’s assets
explore the current approach of their pension fund to •	
check whether it reflects their policy on climate change 
risk
behave as active owners by encouraging their pension •	
fund managers to engage with companies on climate 
change risks and by participating in the public policy 
debate.
Importantly, the report recommends that trustees should: 
‘investigate the linkages between climate change and their 
fiduciary duties with respect to providing pension funds 
over the long term. Within these fiduciary duties, corporate 
pension funds should be encouraged to align their 
approach to climate change risks with sponsoring 
company policies’ (Carbon Trust 2005: 15). This suggests 
that trustees from company pension schemes should 
consider climate change under their fiduciary duty and 
should not adopt a passive stance to the potential impact 
of climate change risk on their fund. 
It has also been acknowledged that climate change can 
provide opportunities as well a risks, through, for example, 
investment in companies that focus on renewable energies 
(Carbon Trust 2005). Again, trustees should assess 
whether their fund is adequately considering such 
opportunities in its investment strategy.
The Carbon Trust (2006) developed a model for estimating 
the amount of shareholder value at risk from climate 
change. It found certain industries (bulk commodity 
chemicals and building materials) to be significantly at 
risk. The Trust’s report makes a series of 
recommendations for senior management and investors. 
One of these recommendations is for institutional investors 
to ensure that climate change risk features on their agenda 
for engagement and dialogue with their investee 
companies.7
A questionnaire survey was conducted by the UK Social 
Investment Forum (UKSIF) to discover the attitudes and 
practices of UK pension funds in relation to responsible 
investment (UKSIF 2007). The questionnaire asked 
6.  These risks have been identified by the US State Pension 
Fund-led Investor Network on Climate Risk (see Carbon Trust 
2005).
7.  See Solomon (2007) for a more detailed summary of the 
findings from the Carbon Trust reports (2005, 2006).
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(2007), discusses a qualitative survey of 19 mainstream 
UK fund management houses representing over £3 trillion 
assets. The research did not focus solely on SRI specialists, 
which implied a relatively unbiased view. Overall, the 
survey indicated that climate change as a specific ESG 
issue was not attracting the attention it has deserved since 
Stern (2006). The report shows that the potential 
economic influence of climate change has been recognised 
by the fund management industry but that this recognition 
has yet to change mainstream investment behaviour. The 
authors comment that: ‘While corporate governance and 
SRI policy makers have expressed a fundamental interest 
for some time, their fund management counterparts see 
climate change as an influence in the future but not yet 
core to investment decision-making’ (HeadLand 
Consultancy 2007: 3).
The report acknowledges that, as the impact of climate 
change is considered to be slow and cumulative, it is 
outside a typical fund manager’s remit as ‘they are not 
looking at 2012 let alone 2050’. Many thought social and 
environmental reporting (SER) to be of little value, usually 
being simply an attempt to get the ‘green fraternity off 
their backs’ and that: ‘If the statement of investment 
principles does not include an obligation to consider 
climate change, [fund] managers have no responsibility to 
take it into consideration’ (HeadLand Consultancy 2007: 7).
Respondents suggested that even those companies that 
have themselves identified and are managing climate 
change issues in their own businesses may fail to ensure 
that their pension fund trustees do the same: ‘Some also 
believe the onus rests on trustees to instruct both 
corporate management and fund managers to drive 
changes in corporate behaviour that would, in turn, 
generate movement towards a more sustainable and low 
carbon economy’ (HeadLand Consultancy 2007: 7). The 
report therefore highlights the potentially potent role of 
trustees in driving change in corporate behaviour. 
Discovering whether this power to influence corporate 
behaviour is being harnessed by trustees and whether 
they are aware of their potential, are important aspects of 
the current research.
A RIsIng demAnd FoR ClImATe ChAnge 
dIsClosURes FRom The InsTITUTIonAl InvesTmenT 
CommUnITy
One study (ACCA 2007) focuses on reporting climate 
change information but also emphasises user needs. In 
other words, the report acknowledges that the institutional 
investment community is demanding information on 
climate change for making decisions. Spence and Gray 
(2007) provide interview evidence from listed companies 
that there is a market-driven motivation for SER, arising 
from a desire to be included in SRI indices or achieving 
differentiation among investors through other means. 
Spence and Gray discuss 42 high-impact companies that 
received 2006 ACCA UK awards for sustainability 
reporting. The report makes frequent reference to a 
significant and growing investor (and other user) demand 
for detailed disclosures on climate change: ‘There is also 
increasing interest from the investment community, with 
the Carbon Disclosure Project, the Institutional Investors 
Group on Climate Change (IIGCC), Investor Statement on 
Climate Change and the…FTSE4Good Climate Change 
criterion’ (Spence and Gray 2007: 7).
Institutional investors require detailed company-specific 
benchmark targets in order to engage effectively with 
companies on climate change issues, eg emissions. At the 
moment, there are industry-level targets but these need to 
be disaggregated, and presented with interpretation and 
explanation: ‘Although a large proportion of companies are 
reporting data, the format is still inconsistent and 
comparisons are extremely difficult. Much needs to be 
done in this area to ensure that the data reported are 
useful to the report users, including investors’ (Spence and 
Gray 2007: 10).
The report claims that 79% of companies in the sample 
provided descriptions of climate change impacts, and 
two-thirds reported performance trends with explanation: 
‘This helps readers and stakeholders to understand the 
performance data and put them into context’ (Spence and 
Gray 2007: 11).
Centrica have reported carbon dioxide emissions and 
emissions in relation to EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
which is ‘useful for investors wishing to calculate the 
financial impact of Centrica’s carbon emissions and 
trading’ (Spence and Gray 2007: 12) Disclosure of targets 
is important, ‘so that stakeholders can assess the 
relevance and suitability of targets, thereby understanding 
the company’s approach’ (Spence and Gray 2007: 15).
It is envisaged that future climate change reporting 
requirements of stakeholders will change as the issue 
becomes more urgent and prominent…it is becoming 
increasingly apparent from recent scientific papers that 
climate change is occurring much more quickly than 
predicted (Spence and Gray 2007: 16).
The main reason for companies to report on climate 
change performance is that stakeholders demand it. 
Investors…have started to take a definite interest in 
organisations’ carbon management and reporting, putting 
increasing pressure on those who do not report to start 
doing so (Spence and Gray 2007: 19).
CollAboRATIve ACTIon on ClImATe ChAnge by The 
globAl InsTITUTIonAl InvesTmenT CommUnITy
Institutional investors are not working in isolation on 
climate change but are collaborating and, importantly, 
singling out climate change as an especially relevant ESG 
factor. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) is the world’s 
largest collaboration of institutional investors, including 50 
signed-up members who together own assets of $40 
trillion. They have collectively signed a single global 
request for corporate disclosures of information on 
greenhouse gas emissions. The Climate Disclosure 
Standards Board (CDSB) is addressing the lack of 
consistency in climate change reporting. It seems that the 
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investment community is increasingly using carbon data 
to assess material financial risks arising from climate 
change. This type of collaborative action is quite 
unprecedented within the pension fund industry. Indeed, 
corporate pension funds have traditionally almost never 
been activist: ‘There is an implicit understanding that each 
company’s pension fund will refrain from an activist stance 
in return for a reciprocal stance from all others’ (Monks 
and Sykes 2006: 232).
Clearly, the potential impact of climate change has 
changed pension fund behaviour dramatically.
InsTITUTIonAl InvesToR ACTIvIsm And 
engAgemenT on ClImATe ChAnge
Academic studies have found that the process of private 
SEE disclosure, through one-to-one meetings between 
institutional investors and their investee companies, has 
been evolving quickly over the last decade (Friedman and 
Miles 2001; Solomon and Solomon 2006). Engagement 
and dialogue in the specific area of climate change has 
resulted in the exertion of demand-led pressure on 
companies to disclose carbon emissions and other climate 
change data.
Investor pressure is increasingly being used to encourage 
businesses to tackle their emissions. One large 
institutional investor recently engaged with a group of 
companies that had persistently not disclosed their 
carbon footprint as part of the annual Carbon Disclosure 
Project questionnaire: over half subsequently provided a 
full answer and others provided some information. Other 
investors are working with companies to encourage 
appropriate action and enhance the market value of their 
business (CBI 2007: 31).
Such active involvement in climate change issues by the 
institutional investment community indicates that the 
markets are responding to climate change risk.
PUblIC veRsUs PRIvATe seCToR PensIon FUnds And 
esg ConsIdeRATIons
Solomon and Solomon (2003) reveal significant 
differences in attitude towards SRI between trustees from 
the private and public sectors. This is consistent with the 
views of Monks (2001), who considers that public sector 
pension funds are more interested in corporate 
accountability to a broad group of stakeholders than are 
private sector pension funds, which are forced to be 
primarily concerned with maximising shareholder value 
and driving corporate profitability.10 For example, Solomon 
and Solomon (2003) claim that trustees from public sector 
10. Monks (2001: 129) stated: ‘By creating a system in which 
“ownership” is nobody’s concern, the private companies have 
effectively neutered the vote of their system. This is in contrast 
with the public pension plans, some of which are conspicuously 
activist, and the labour plans that are beginning to think in global 
terms’.
pension funds agreed significantly more than private 
sector trustees with the suggestion that the (then) new SIP 
disclosure requirement would be an inducement to 
companies to act in a socially responsible manner. This 
difference in view between the public and private sectors is 
not surprising. In the private sector, the fund managers of 
defined benefit schemes are subject to a conflict of 
interest, or even to tacit collusion between corporate 
sponsors,11 in that they are employed by the corporate 
sponsor to manage the fund. Excessive shareholder 
activism could result in the fund manager effectively losing 
his/her job, as companies are hostile to activist techniques 
being equally directed towards themselves. It has therefore 
been suggested that private sector pension funds have a 
tendency to pursue ‘self-protective passivity’ in their 
investment strategies, whereas public sector pension funds 
are not subject to such constraints (Coffee 1991).
sCePTICs In The ClImATe ChAnge ‘debATe’
Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence 
demonstrating progressive global warming, linked to 
human activity, there is a continuing ‘debate’ on climate 
change. There are those who do not accept the gravity of 
the scientific findings and who challenge climate change 
theorists (for example, Carter 2007; Morris 1997). Some 
consider global warming to be no more than 
scaremongering, inflated by media misrepresentation: ‘The 
empirical evidence used to support the global warming 
hypothesis has often been misleading, with “scare stories” 
promoted in the media that are distortions of scientific 
reality’ (Lewis 2007: 2).
There are sceptics who do not accept that the threat from 
climate change is as urgent or as pronounced as we may 
be led to believe from scientific reports. There are those 
who suggest that the climate change issue represents no 
more than an example of doom-mongering. There are 
those who believe that the current warming is simply a 
cyclical movement rather than a trend: ‘Global warming 
and cooling scares pre-date the current concern over 
global warming that began in the 1980s…The prophets of 
carbon energy alarmism have been proven wrong time 
and again along the way’ (Bradley 2003: 19).
The government claim that global warming is more 
threatening than terrorism is alarmist and unwarranted…
It is strikingly similar to the direct predictions of 40 years 
ago of an imminent ice age and to other past doom 
forecasts due to alleged overpopulation, depletion of food 
supplies, and chemical pollution (Lewis 2007: 2).
As well as a wave of scepticism about the causes and 
effects of climate change, there is also an element of 
denial, in the form of apathy. This is considered to be a 
common reaction by society to high-consequence risks 
such as climate change, where people cannot see how they 
11.  I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this 
comment.
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as individuals can influence the state of the world and 
therefore choose to ignore it. These are core concepts 
underlying the notion of a risk society (Beck 1992, 1997, 
1999; Giddens 1990, 1991).
The climate change sceptics have put forward detailed 
deconstructions of reports by the IPCC and Stern, 
providing reasons why the scientists’ findings may be 
flawed (for example, Carter et al. 2006; Lewis 2007). These 
arguments tend to be based on speculation about 
measurement methods and modelling that could be 
applied to any outcomes of scientific research and, if taken 
seriously, would render all scientific findings invalid.
There are those who believe that a government-led, 
international collaborative approach to climate change is 
unnecessary as the ‘market’ will find a solution. As 
suggested in a recent lecture: ‘once the apocalyptic 
forecast is seen in context and the likely failures of 
government action are recognised, the case for urgent, 
centralised action against climate change seems much 
less convincing’ (Robinson 2008: 23).
[I]f damaging man-made climate change is in prospect, 
the only real hope of avoiding the damage is probably 
through market responses…a big advantage of relying on 
markets is their flexibility and adaptability. Views about 
global warming will change. It may appear a more serious 
issue now, in which case markets will enhance the 
profitability of ‘greenery’, so reacting in the ‘right’ 
direction. Or it may seem less serious, so that ‘greenery’ 
starts to go out of fashion and the market again reacts in 
the right direction (Robinson 2008: 24–25).
Interestingly, studies of the pace at which SRI12 has 
accelerated in recent years indicates that the financial 
markets are taking the initiative in dealing with climate 
change and other ESG issues effectively. As we saw above, 
‘markets’ are demanding climate change reporting from 
companies. Certainly, the force of the free markets is at 
work, promoting companies that are ‘greener’ and shifting 
funds away from businesses that do not adopt a socially 
responsible approach. Nonetheless, according to Stern and 
the IPCC, the scale of the problem would suggest that 
leaving markets to solve it is not sufficient and that a 
combination of natural forces and government 
collaboration on climate change is necessary: ‘Market 
forces will drive big changes, but they will not by 
themselves be enough to do the job. The full range of 
public policies must be deployed to create the right 
incentives’ (CBI 2007: 3)
Sceptics have dismissed the findings of the IPCC by 
suggesting that they overstated the effect of anthropogenic 
(human induced) greenhouse gases on the climate (Lewis 
2007). 
12.  SRI may be interpreted as a natural, free market ‘solution’ 
to ESG problems by the institutional investment community.
Another notable point is that the importance of climate-
change-related risks and opportunities to the investment 
community is not dependent on the doubtfulness or 
otherwise of the ‘science’. If government policy is tackling 
climate change then this can affect investment irrespective 
of actual climate change. For example, if the government 
regulates, taxes or encourages pro-climate change 
behaviours, this can affect companies’ financial 
performance.13
On the basis of the above, we seek in this study to solicit 
the views of pension fund trustees in order to ascertain 
their attitudes towards their role in relation to climate 
change. Especially, this study builds on previous research 
(for example, UKSIF 2007) by using interview methodology 
to further our understanding of trustees’ views.
13.  I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for making 
this observation.
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This preliminary report summarises the views of 20 
interviewees from the trustee boards of pension funds, 
whose sponsor companies were initially selected from the 
FTSE100 list. We encountered some difficulty in 
persuading trustees to participate, therefore we also 
interviewed volunteers from other pension funds. The 
interviews were conducted between October 2007 and 
May 2008. Details of the size and type of pension fund 
from which the trustees were drawn are presented in Table 
3.1 (see page 18). Table 3.1 also includes details relating to 
the period for which the trustees have been on their 
current trustee board, how they were appointed (where 
possible), their professional qualifications and any 
personal interests they may have that could relate to social 
and environmental issues. Where possible, we interviewed 
member-nominated trustees and at least ten of our 
interviewees were member-nominated. Given the 
difficulties in attracting interviewees to participate in the 
research, however, this was not possible in every case. We 
believed that it was likely that member-nominated trustees 
might have more awareness of, or interest in, wider issues 
such as climate change.14 
It is also noteworthy that almost three-quarters of the 
interviewees had either a specific qualification relating to 
trusteeship or pension fund investment, or had relevant 
experience. This suggests that the people who participated 
in our research were generally experienced and highly 
knowledgeable in the area of pensions. Similarly, half of 
our interviewees had acted as trustees for more than five 
years, indicating their long-term experience of trusteeship. 
Another interesting observation from the data in Table 3.1 
is that 13 of the interviewees stated they were members of 
societies that were in some way related to nature, the 
environment (wildlife) and/or charity. This would imply that 
they are likely to have a pre-existing interest in social and 
environmental issues such as climate change.
Breaking into the trustee community was the most 
challenging stage, as once interviews began, other trustees 
seemed willing to participate, encouraged by the prospect 
of receiving the final report. They seemed keen to discover 
their peers’ views in this area. Also, the support of ACCA, 
PMI, NAPF and UKSIF helped in attracting participation, as 
the project was advertised widely. The interviews were 
conducted over the telephone, because of the time 
constraint on conducting the survey, and because trustees 
are spread geographically around Britain. The interviews 
were semi-structured, with general research questions 
allowing the interviewer to follow up interesting points 
made by interviewees and develop issues as they arose. All 
interviews were recorded and transcribed for analysis. 
The research questions evolved throughout the project, 
with any new issues revealed in interviews being 
incorporated into the questions.
14.  We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for making this 
point. We had assumed this might be the case but had not made 
our assumption explicit in earlier drafts of the report.
The ReseARCh APPRoACh
From a methodological perspective this study differs from 
previous interview research into the SRI (Friedman and 
Miles 2001; Solomon and Darby 2005; Solomon and 
Solomon 2006). These previous studies applied a 
grounded theory approach, assuming that the researcher 
did not attempt to influence the views of the research 
participants. Previous work has sought to theorise the 
evolution of SRI by questioning members of the 
institutional investment community about their views on 
SRI. In these earlier studies, researchers aimed to leave 
the research participants ‘as they found them’. In this 
sense, the resulting theoretical model was ‘grounded’ in 
the data and the research process was not influenced by 
the personal views of the researchers. 
In contrast, the motivation for the present study derives 
from a normative view held by the researcher that the 
trustee community ‘should’ be engaging in the climate 
change debate and considering the risks arising from 
climate change for the pension fund industry in an active 
manner. Further, the research is being carried out in order 
to change the current situation ‘for the better’ (according 
to the researcher’s ‘world view’). This means that the 
methodological framework needs to allow for the research 
process to influence the interviewees so as to alter their 
‘world view’. This project represents the initial stage of a 
broader, cyclical study investigating (and consequently 
influencing) the attitudes of trustees regarding their role 
and responsibilities in relation to climate change. The 
research therefore draws on the body of literature relating 
to soft system methodology and action research15 (for 
example, Argyris 1993; Greenwood and Levin 1998; 
Checkland and Poulter 2007). The complete research 
project aims to conduct an iterative process of interviewing 
trustees and other members of the institutional investment 
community, about the trustees’ roles and responsibilities 
regarding climate change. Each stage results in a change 
in the world view of the groups being researched. This 
report, which represents stage one of this iterative process, 
involves instigating a learning process by which both the 
interviewer and the interviewee learn from the research. 
This learning process differs from that encapsulated in 
more positivist research methodologies. 
15.  Soft system methodology and action research adopt an 
approach which is far more interactive than other interviewing 
methods and involve an iterative research method. Usually, there 
is a problematisation within an organisation, requiring research in 
situ to find joint solutions. In the case of this study, the 
problematisation is industry-wide, ie the need for pension fund 
trustees to tackle climate change issues. This study represents 
the first stage of interviews to assess the trustees’ ‘world view’ 
relating to climate change in order to then pursue further 
interviews and interact with the interviewees to find ways of 
dealing with the problematised issues.
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Trustee
Time on 
board Nomination
Relevant 
professional 
qualifications
Membership of 
relevant 
organisations
Size (£s) 
of fund
Size 
(members) Type fund
1 4 years Member-nominated
Fellow, Chartered 
Insurance Institute 
and PMI Associate n/a 2.6bn 16,000 DB
2 10 years Company-nominated PMI qualification
National Trust, 
Historic Transit 
Association, Wood 
Turning Club 1.7bn 16,000 DB
3 15 years Company-nominated Trustee certificate None 60m 1,000 DB/DC
4 1 year Member-nominated None Member of a charity 450m 16,000 DB
5 3 years n/a
ACCA qualified 
accountant None 34m 708 DB
6 5 years Chairman of trustees
Banking & Finance 
degree Friends of the Earth 230m 7,000 DB
7 10 years Independent trustee
Chartered 
accountant
National Trust, 
English Heritage and 
Devon Wildlife 20m 400 DB
8 6 years n/a
Chartered 
accountant, PMI 
trustee qualification
Fellow of RSA, 
National Trust 30m 400 DB
9 9 years
Member-nominated. 
Trustee director None
Member of several 
charitable 
organisations 40bn 350,000 n/a
10 1 year Member-nominated
Fellow of Faculty of 
Actuaries. Worked 
in pensions over 20 
years
Active church 
member and charity 
worker 1.2bn 17,000
DB with 
DC 
section for 
AVCs
11 2 years Member-nominated None
RSBP and local 
Wildlife Trust 4.5m 447
Final 
salary
12 21 years
Professional trustee, 
independent
Chartered 
accountant
Co-operative Union, 
Ethical Investment 
Research 550m 40,000 DB
13 4 years n/a Certified accountant National Trust, RSPB 3.9bn 95,000
Final 
salary
14 3 years Company-nominated None National Trust, RHS 4.5m 100 DB
15 9 years
Member-nominated. 
Trustee director
Passed online 
trustee toolkit, PMI 
certificate in trustee 
knowledge and 
understanding Labour Party 19bn 210,000 DB
16 n/a Member-nominated
Economics 
background
Local environmental 
groups and 
Fairtrade campaign n/a n/a DB
17 11 years Member-nominated
Qualification in 
investments None 400m n/a
DB with 
AVC
18 5 years Member-nominated None None 1.5bn n/a
Final 
salary
19 24 years Company-nominated Personnel manager National Trust n/a 820 n/a
20 1 year Member-nominated None None 220m 1,000 DB
Table 3.1: Trustee and pension fund details  
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More positivist approaches involve one-way learning,16 
where the researcher gathers data and reports upon the 
data objectively, without influencing the ‘world view’ of the 
participants. Fig. 3.1 summarises the methodological 
approach adopted in the current research.
In this study the findings are reported objectively and the 
analysis of the data is conducted objectively. Nonetheless, 
to some extent the interview process tended to influence 
the views of the research participants. This was partly 
because of the subjective stance of the researcher, but also 
because of the trustees’ reactions to the interviews.
Some aspects of the ‘soft systems’ methodological 
approach seem especially relevant to this study.17 For 
example, the method uses ‘rich pictures’ to describe the 
problem (Checkland and Poulter 2007).18 These were 
developed by the researcher throughout the research 
process in order to problematise trustees’ involvement (or 
lack of involvement) in the climate change debate in terms 
of their role and responsibilities as they are and as they 
‘should’ be, from the normative perspective of the 
researcher. The development of rich pictures aided the 
researcher in identifying problems relevant to trustees and 
climate change in order to develop and refine the research 
questions.
A second characteristic of this methodological approach, 
relevant to this project, is that consensus was not 
considered realistically achievable. Instead, the researcher 
assumed that the population of research participants may 
come to an ‘accommodation’ (Checkland and Poulter 
2007). This applies to the trustee community, because as 
we see in the following section, the research revealed a 
wide diversity of ‘world views’. It is unlikely that trustees 
have a consensus view on how to deal with climate change, 
given the emergent and controversial nature of the climate 
change debate. Furthermore, all the trustees we 
interviewed came from different perspectives, with 
different world views and different backgrounds. The best 
that could be achieved was to improve the situation in 
terms of their knowledge base and to develop a new world 
view among the trustee community, not based on 
achieving a consensus but on arriving at a community-
16.  Termed single-loop learning, according to Argyris (1993) in 
action research. This type of ‘learning’ is considered by some 
academic as inferior to double-loop learning, as information only 
flows one way between parties. Double-loop learning involves 
both parties engaging with each other in a more dialogical 
manner.
17.  There are similarities and diff erences between soft system 
methodology and the approach used in this study. For example, 
an evident difference is that making a case study of one 
organisation is the usual method used, whereas this study is 
based on interviews with people from different organisations. 
Nonetheless, we focus on the similarities in this section.
18.  Rich pictures are generally hand-drawn diagrams, 
developed by the researcher, which attempt to express the 
problem to be dealt with in the research, by specifying the people 
and groups involved and the issues relating to them.
level accommodation with the climate change issue. 
Indeed, one similarity between the approach used in this 
study and action research methodology19 is that, ‘both the 
researchers and practitioners are able to gain knowledge 
through participation in the project…the methodology 
provides a powerful means of improving and enhancing 
practice’ (Hoque 2006: 366).
Although action research and soft systems methodology 
have been criticised for a lack of objectivity, the advantage 
of a more interactive relationship between researcher and 
researched is the powerful potential for the research to 
result in change to the status quo, through changing the 
world view of the research participants.
One salient issue arising in the research was that of 
non-response. Because it was so difficult to solicit 
participation, we had to advertise the project, inviting 
participation. Therefore, many interviewees were 
volunteers, so our sample was likely to be biased towards 
trustees who were relatively interested in climate change 
issues. Many trustees we approached declined to 
participate. This may indicate they shared a sceptical view 
on climate change: ‘I am appalled at this spend of public 
funds on what seems to be yet another “research” project 
which looks like it is only getting funding because it has 
the words “climate change” tagged on the end’ (non-
participating Director of FTSE100 pension fund in a sector 
with high environmental impact).
It was interesting to speculate on reasons why trustees 
would not participate. It is possible that their sponsor 
companies to some extent blocked participation. This 
could be because companies were embarrassed that 
despite strong public support for environmental policies 
within their corporate operations they did not pass on 
concerns about climate change and other ESG factors to 
their pension funds. This asymmetry would represent an 
acute embarrassment for them if it became public, 
especially given suggestions by practitioner research (eg 
HeadLand Consultancy 2007) that companies should 
adopt consistent approaches to ESG between themselves 
and their pension funds. These issues are discussed 
further in the concluding section.
From a methodological perspective, the high level of 
non-response could be seen as evidence of defensive 
strategies, whereby members of the trustee community 
were ‘in denial’ about the research question. In other 
words, their evasion may represent a refusal to consider 
that climate change represents an important issue (Argyris 
1993). One focus of action research methodology is on 
ways in which individuals and groups develop defensive 
modes of behaviour in order to maintain the status quo 
and resist change that may arise through double-loop 
learning. As well as non-response, the attitudes portrayed 
19.  Again, there are also signifi cant diff erences, mainly that 
‘action research’ usually focuses on changing one organisation 
through a long process of case studies and interviews.
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by the trustees interviewed were to some extent suggestive 
of defensive routines. According to the action research 
literature, such defensive routines and attitudes occur in 
response to perceived threats and inhibit genuine learning 
within organisations. In this case, the trustees may 
experience a threat to their attitudes and behaviour in 
relation to climate change. Learning is crucial if trustees 
are going to address a problem such as their role in 
climate change when they may feel threatened or 
uncomfortable about the issues because they realise they 
would have to change the status quo. From a subjective 
stance, changes to the status quo are necessary if pension 
funds are to move forward by embracing the risks and 
opportunities presented by climate change.
sTAge 2
•	Establish	subjective	view	of	
researcher
•	Trustees	should	be	considering	
climate change
•	Develop	detailed	research	
questions
sTAge 3
•	Research	world	view	of	groups	
involved
•	Interview	trustees
sTAge 6
•	New	world	view	created
•	Trustees	alter	their	role	in	
climate change
sTAge 5
•	Change	world	view	of	groups	
involved by dissemination of 
findings
•	Launch	report
sTAge 4
•	Alter	world	view	of	research	
participants through research 
process
•	Trustees	affected	by	interviews
sTAge 1
•	Establish	problem
•	Establish	extent	to	which	
trustees consider climate change
Figure 3.1: Research approach
lImITATIons
One limitation of the study was the low response rate. 
Scepticism may be a possible explanation for the low 
response to our call for participation in the research. We 
did find evidence of scepticism regarding climate change 
among the trustees we interviewed. This took the form of 
uncertainty about the genuine relationship between 
human activity and climate change as well as a non-
acceptance that climate change would affect financial 
returns in the short term. These views may be dispelled by 
education and training. The concept of trustee bodies as 
‘learning organisations’ allows intervention through 
research and dissemination of research findings to alter 
trustees’ world views and their views of their role and 
responsibilities in relation to climate change.
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The data from the 20 interviews were analysed in order to 
detect themes. The themes that emerged from the data 
have been grouped under a series of collective headings.
(i) Trustees’ general approach to climate change
(ii) Trustees’ views on climate change and financial 
return
(iii) Trustees’ accountability to pension fund members 
on climate change issues
(iv) Obstacles to trustees’ consideration of climate 
change
(v) Trustees’ attitudes towards their future role in 
climate change
(vi) Discriminant analysis: a size effect in trustees’ 
attitudes.
(I) TRUsTees’ geneRAl APPRoACh To ClImATe 
ChAnge
This section provides some evidence on how trustees are 
treating climate change within their remit, and the extent 
to which they consider it is an important factor for their 
pension fund. Specifically, we consider whether climate 
change features on the agenda of trustees’ meetings and 
the importance attributed to climate change by trustees in 
relation to other ESG issues.
Climate change rarely on the agenda of trustee meetings
The overall impression from our interviewees was that 
climate change did not appear on the agenda for their 
meetings and was rarely, if ever, mentioned: ‘No, we don’t 
discuss it’ [climate change] (T4) and ‘A very, very small 
amount of our time (T18).
One trustee believed that climate change should perhaps 
be discussed ‘once in a while’, but concluded, after a 
discussion with the interviewer, that once a year, for about 
half an hour, would be enough. In answer to the question, 
‘Do you consider that climate change is an issue that you 
should consider at trustee meetings?’, ten interviewees 
responded negatively whereas nine said that climate 
change should be mentioned occasionally, but certainly 
not regularly. A further trustee considered that it could be 
on the agenda, responding: ‘Maybe, yeah, perhaps, yeah’ 
(T8).
Climate change in relation to esg considerations generally
The majority of our interviewees (14) considered that 
climate change was a relatively unimportant issue in 
isolation but that it represented a factor to be considered 
among the whole gamut of ESG considerations; for 
example: ‘I think on its own [climate change] is not at all 
[important]. As a factor in the general environment it has 
an impact’ (T4).
Furthermore, climate change was viewed as relatively less 
important than other ESG factors: ‘I think a lot of trustees 
would find abuse of people, inappropriate labour mobility, 
investing in inappropriate organisations or governments as 
important, or probably more important, than climate 
change’ (T3).
Another trustee commented that on a scale from 1 to 10, 
climate change has an importance of about 2. Another 
also attempted a quantification: ‘I’d say for any responsible 
individual it must be important and I think if I’m taking five 
or six areas then it’s either 20% or slightly more in our 
consideration, climate change’ (T3).
Two of the interviewees stated that it was ‘not at all’ 
important (T5), and ‘unimportant’ (T8). Four interviewees 
said that although climate change was not a very 
important consideration at present, it would become 
increasingly important in the future.
(II) TRUsTees’ vIews on ClImATe ChAnge And 
FInAnCIAl ReTURn
In this section we provide evidence about whether the 
trustees considered climate change to be part of their 
fiduciary duty, and whether they believed climate change 
to be material to pension fund investment.
Confusion over whether climate change is part of a 
trustee’s fiduciary duty
There was a clear dichotomy in trustees’ views about 
whether or not climate change represented part of their 
fiduciary duty. Eleven of the interviewees believed that it 
fell under the umbrella of their fiduciary duty, but generally 
in conjunction with other factors.
Oh absolutely, I think yeah. (T3)
I would say so, yeah, I mean anything that could affect 
the provision of the pension’s entitlements to members is 
of relevance to the trustees so this could be one such 
thing – the answer is yes. (T8)
Yes, I think it should be; there’s kind of a personal view 
that everybody…should have it at the back of their mind, 
but if you think of the trustee board as a parallel to a real 
company board then company board members do have a 
duty to say ‘can we change our business at all to reduce 
energy consumption, pollution, everything else that 
affects climate change’, so yes I think we do. (T2)
One interviewee, from a large fund explained: ‘My personal 
view is that it would be a breach of our fiduciary duty if we 
did not take into account extra financial issues that could 
materially impact upon our portfolio’ (T9). This view is 
consistent with that encapsulated in the ‘Freshfields 
Report’ (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005). He later 
continued: ‘I mean climate change is the “E” of ESG, a big 
chunk of the “E”, and the interesting issue about the 
climate change side is that it has got the capacity to have 
absolutely profound and devastating negative effects on 
the wider environmental issues, the droughts, the floods…’ 
4. Themes evident from the interviews
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(T9). The depth of knowledge held by this trustee showed 
that he was an outlier, coming from the largest pension 
fund interviewed.
Seven of the trustees stated that climate change was not 
encapsulated in their fiduciary duty, with one stating that it 
was in conflict with it: ‘It’s [climate change] in conflict with 
the general principle of protecting the members’ benefits’ 
(T4).
Well as things stand, I think the answer is no, isn’t it. I 
think that’s probably one where there is a right and wrong 
answer and I think the right answer is no, but it’s 
unfortunate. (T11)
Well, no: other than that it’s part of our overall 
responsibility to protect out members’ funds…I mean in 
the same way that we wouldn’t necessarily recommend 
people investing in, I don’t know, junk bonds…it’s part of 
the mix but it’s not enough…it’s something you have to 
take into consideration like everything else…it’s not our 
responsibility on its own. (T6)
Another trustee seemed to imply that climate change was 
not encapsulated in his fiduciary duty but he seemed 
uncomfortable about saying so: ‘Er, yeah, er, sort of, er, I 
mean, I, I think it would be callous to say no, isn’t it? …I 
think it’s, um, recommended rather than obligatory’ (T18).
Despite the fact that almost all the trustees interviewed 
sought legal advice on their responsible investment policy, 
there was low consensus about whether or not climate 
change should be considered within their fiduciary duty, 
implying that the advice they were receiving may not have 
been consistent.
The ‘missing link’: making the connection between climate 
change and financial return
Despite a general interest in climate change issues among 
the trustees, and a general understanding of what would 
result from climate change, they seemed to display little 
understanding of a direct link between climate change and 
financial return. Many commented that the ‘connection’ 
between climate change and financial return was unclear. 
When asked whether they thought climate change was an 
important factor affecting financial return and shareholder 
value, most of the interviewees claimed that it had very 
little, if any impact: 
It’s not relevant. For us, it just has not entered into our 
discussions at all…I think, if you like, the official answer 
on that would be, we don’t think it’s an issue that would 
affect the viability of the pension fund in meeting its 
obligations. That would be the official answer. I think in 
reality, we just haven’t given that any kind of thought. (T8)
I think the honest answer is to say that we’ve yet to make 
that connection…I think at the moment it’s barely 
scratching the surface…it’s a huge concept, it’s a big 
topic, what may help is to translate what we mean by that 
back into language that currently appears in SRI. (T10)
I think we need to be very careful not to headlong dive 
towards a policy of investment which takes all the factors 
of climate change into account at the expense of return 
on investment. (T18)
This comment shows there is a pervasive and continuing 
belief among members of the trustee community that SRI 
damages financial return, which is hard to dispel, despite 
the growing evidence to the contrary.
Another interviewee believed that climate change was not 
at all important as a factor affecting financial return and 
shareholder value. He also said that it should not be taken 
into account in the pension fund’s investment strategy. 
This prevalent view among interviewees contrasts starkly 
with the Carbon Trust’s recommendations (2005) that 
trustees should investigate the linkages between climate 
change risk and their fiduciary duties. Conversely, it 
confirms the UNEP findings (UNEP 2007, 2008) that the 
connection between climate change and financial risk is 
not understood and that this is preventing the financial 
sector from engaging with climate change issues.
Where interviewees did believe that climate change could 
affect shareholder value and financial return, their 
explanations were often vague, indicating a partial 
understanding of the connection:
I believe climate change is a significant issue just in 
general terms; and it is bound to have some impact in 
some way on the way business is conducted and the 
returns that businesses get from whatever they do and 
indeed the opportunities for business. Some businesses 
will prosper and...new businesses [will] arise because of 
climate change; others will fall away for different reasons. 
So there will be an impact, and therefore there will be an 
impact for pension funds in terms of their investments 
and so on and the returns from those investments. (T8, 
emphasis added)
I mean, climate change affects the economy…and 
therefore the returns on investment are likely to be 
suppressed by the overall cost to the economy. It’s hard 
to think what else. We haven’t got a climate action plan of 
any kind for the pension scheme. (T16, emphasis added)
When trustees were asked whether they considered 
climate change could have a material impact over the long 
term, there was a slightly more positive response. Eleven 
trustees responded ‘yes’, but four said ‘no’, with another 
admitting: ‘To be honest, we don’t know’ (T1).
These findings reflected those of UKSIF (2007), which 
suggest that trustees believe that ESG factors are material. 
Nonetheless, despite a general belief that climate change 
would have a material impact in the long run, trustees’ 
explanations of the nature of this material impact were, 
again, rather vague and unspecific: ‘Well clearly in terms of 
fossil fuels, city centre life, transport policy, it all has an 
impact on climate change doesn’t it?’ (T3, emphasis 
added).
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I take it [climate change] to mean changes in 
temperature, rainfall and so on and if they change, either 
getting hotter or colder, then it will affect activities that 
can take place in any one particular part of the world. (T2)
One trustee explained that potential benefits and 
opportunities relating to climate change were, in his view, 
over-valued, referring specifically to, ‘anything to do with 
green energy at the moment within the UK’ (T6).
There were rare cases where a trustee provided a detailed 
explanation of climate change effects globally but did not 
make a connection with pension fund investment.
It’s going to have major economic impact on some areas, 
like perhaps Sahara in Africa; depending on the impact 
also you may get areas such as Canada and the Northern 
United States, where you may get profound changes 
when effectively you get less freezing. So you may 
actually get quite profound climate change or impact on 
lifestyles and on how realistic it is to live in certain areas 
that are close to the Arctic or the reverse, close to the 
Sahara where you’ve got extremes of temperature; so I 
think there will be big impacts on some specific areas. 
(T7)
Even the trustee from the largest fund interviewed 
commented: ‘Well, the difficulty is that there’s no academic 
evidence that actually substantiates that ESG integration 
improves returns. I mean if you look at the latest study 
from UNEP FI and Mercer’s I think the best they can say is 
that…it’s simply not the case that there is a negative 
return’ (T9). This interviewee discussed at length the fact 
that although ‘good’ financial returns seemed to be 
associated with ‘good’ CSR, there was no determinable 
causal relationship. In other words, correlation had been 
found but not causality. He continued:
everything’s under threat at the moment. I mean, there 
have been riots in Mexico over the price of tortilla flour, 
the price of pasta is shooting up in Italy and again there’s 
a world shortage of cereals…a lot of farming, agricultural 
production has been moved over to produce soya…for 
use as bio-fuels… it [climate change] affects everything, 
commodities, and a whole range of our physical 
investments in the corporate world…If you look at the 
IPCC Report and the Stern Report…if those reports are 
only one quarter correct then...the level of risk to our 
investments is still incredibly high. If both those reports 
are correct then we could be facing a very bumpy ride 
ahead…so our view is that value is being put at risk. (T9, 
emphasis added)
This detailed, insightful explanation of the linkages 
between climate change and portfolio investment was an 
isolated example from the interview data. It is possible 
that, because climate change is generally viewed as a 
long-term material risk, trustees of short-term-oriented 
pension funds may dismiss it, given that they tend to focus 
on short-term investment return and risk (see, for example, 
the Hampel Report 1998). Indeed, the Myners Review 
(2004) states that: ‘While trustees, consultants and fund 
managers agreed in principle that pension funds could 
operate over long time horizons…there was still a 
mismatch between the perceptions of trustees…and fund 
managers [who]…still have unnecessary incentives for 
herding and short-termism in investment’ (Myners Review 
2004: 17).
Trustees should be focusing more closely on long-term 
risks affecting investment. Nonetheless, the risks relating 
to climate change are quickly moving into the short-term, 
with climate changes occurring far more quickly than 
previously anticipated. 
The ‘beliefs’ of trustees are not to be regarded as an 
ephemeral, personal issue but as a driving force in setting 
investment strategy. Indeed, the Marathon Club, 
committed to promoting ‘long-termism’ in institutional 
investment, has emphasised that, ‘the formulation and 
articulation of trustee investment beliefs is a fundamental 
building block in the setting of a coherent investment 
policy’ (Marathon Club 2007: 10). Furthermore, as the 
Marathon Club outlines, trustees need to devote time and 
effort to determining and making explicit their core beliefs 
as an essential backdrop to making decisions in trustee 
meetings.
(III) TRUsTees’ ACCoUnTAbIlITy To PensIon FUnd 
membeRs on ClImATe ChAnge IssUes
As the pension fund members are the ultimate owners of 
shares invested by the pension fund, trustees’ 
accountability is to them. In this section we consider 
evidence from our interviews on the ways in which trustees 
are discharging this accountability to pension fund 
members, in relation to climate change, by engaging with 
their fund managers as well as with the scheme members 
themselves.
lack of awareness of pension fund managers’ activism 
generally
Although the majority of trustees (14) were aware that 
their fund managers engaged with investee companies, 
they had little detailed knowledge of the engagement 
process. This is despite recommendations such as the 
Myners Review (2004), which emphasises that trustees 
have a responsibility for ensuring that appropriate 
shareholder engagement is undertaken by their 
designated fund managers. Half the interviewees said they 
received summaries of activism from their fund managers, 
but half said they did not. Many interviewees indicated that 
they did not read their fund managers’ activism reports on 
their responsible investment policies:  ‘They’ve certainly 
told us they monitor…but I don’t know the precise details’ 
(T16).
It is surprising that even now, after the efforts of Myners 
(2001, 2004) and other bodies, trustees are still not 
engaging with their fund managers in order to ensure they 
are acting as active shareholders.
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Trustees delegate climate change responsibility to fund 
managers
Although trustees are formally responsible for deciding the 
investment strategy of their pension fund, it seems their 
decision to delegate investment decisions to their fund 
managers has led to an impression that this frees them 
from a need to consider potentially material risk factors 
such as climate change.
I would say that the view is probably agnostic [on 
materiality of climate change] – I mean we’re expecting 
our managers to have that skill…Now it’s not our place 
as trustees to dictate to a manager…if these companies 
are at risk of not being sustainable as businesses that’s 
for them to factor into their fundamental analysis. (T12, 
emphasis added)
We get activism reports…I think only annually, but they 
may be half-annually, which say how the fund managers 
have voted shares in certain companies…so that is the 
limit of our activism. Really we’re just monitoring what 
they do; we don’t instruct the fund managers how to 
use their shares. (T2, emphasis added)
There was also evidence that trustees play a passive role 
within the institutional investment community, with 
comments that: 
We just outsource and shut our eyes: shut our eyes in 
terms of the detail of where the underlying investments 
sit. (T7, emphasis added)
Responsibility for exercising [voting] rights is delegated 
to those managing the investments, so basically we’ve 
washed our hands. (T11, emphasis added)
This contrasts sharply with the Carbon Trust’s 
recommendations (2005) that trustees should be behaving 
as active owners by encouraging their fund managers to 
engage with investee companies on climate change risks. 
The readily available literature on trustees’ role and 
responsibilities also indicates that investment consultants 
can provide advice on responsible investment strategies. 
We did ask the trustees if they sought advice from this 
source and 15 stated that they did. This would suggest 
that they should be receiving advice and information on 
strategy relating to issues such as climate change that 
would help them in advising their fund managers.
scant awareness of pension fund managers’ activism on 
climate change
As well as not instructing their fund managers on climate 
change, the trustees seemed largely unaware of what 
actions their fund managers were taking. The trustees we 
interviewed were generally unaware of whether climate 
change was being addressed by the fund managers in 
carrying out their mandate. When asked if they knew the 
extent to which the one-to-one meetings between their 
fund managers and the investee companies incorporated 
climate change in their discussions, there was a significant 
negative response, with 16 trustees saying they did not:
From memory not a single fund manager has mentioned 
climate change or ethical responsibilities. (T6)
Nothing immediately is springing to mind. (T10)
I don’t even know which companies these fund managers 
are investing in. (T17)
I haven’t actually seen anything including climate change. 
(T18)
In relation to communications from fund managers to 
trustees, one interviewee commented, ‘it’s a very bare 
summary…so whether there’s any climate change content 
in those discussions, it doesn’t say anything about that, 
not that I remember’ (T11).
We asked the trustees if they were aware of any climate 
change-related issues that had arisen in the process of 
engagement and dialogue. Only two trustees responded 
that they were aware of any at all. One commented: 
[Climate change has] been raised occasionally by a 
trustee or the chairman brings it up at the general 
meeting when an individual has raised it and whether it’s 
anything to do with [investee company] – it tends to be 
general rather than specific concerns. (T3, emphasis 
added)
Nonetheless, one trustee admitted that his lack of 
knowledge might be due to a lack of interest on his part: 
‘I’ve never noticed it [climate change] but I wouldn’t say I 
read every word of them [activism reports]; I go through 
them quickly but most of them seem to be round things 
like remuneration packages for board directors and those 
kind of things’ (T2). Another commented: ‘I know that they 
do engage… but whether they actually engage on issues 
such as climate change then I am not so sure (T15).
We also asked the trustees if climate change issues had 
arisen on the agenda for voting in their fund’s investee 
companies. The majority (16) of the interviewees said that 
they had not or that they did not know whether they had. 
One commented, ‘I wouldn’t have actually seen the, er, the 
agendas’ (T18).
Again, this finding suggests a gap between 
recommendations (Carbon Trust Report 2005) that advise 
trustees to behave as active owners by encouraging their 
fund managers to engage with investee companies on 
climate change risks, and trustee practice. Instead, the 
trustees we interviewed were generally unaware of their 
fund managers’ activities in relation to climate change, and 
did not seem to be actively attempting to change their 
knowledge base. One trustee said they only received 
information where fund managers had voted against 
company management, ‘as trustees we’ve only been told 
about the cases where they go against management’ (T12).
In only one case did a trustee instruct the fund managers 
specifically on climate change, ‘we basically, in discussions 
with investment managers, asked them to ensure that they 
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have taken account of the long-term effect of climate 
change in their investment’ (T13).
This isolated case represented what trustees ‘should’ be 
doing.
little engagement between trustees and pension fund 
members
We asked the trustees whether they engaged with their 
pension fund members on climate change issues and on 
the potential impact of climate change on the pension 
fund. All the interviewees except two said they did not. This 
lack of engagement with members was not restricted to 
climate change issues but reflected a general lack of 
engagement across the whole area of SRI. Although 
trustees generally communicated their SRI policy to their 
members, little detail was provided: 
I can’t actually remember seeing it in any of our 
newsletters…I think if there’s been any reference to social 
responsibility at all it’s been a one-liner. (T18)
Communication is one of the areas where the old school 
adage of ‘could do better’ applies to our board of 
trustees. (T10)
I think until recently communication with members has 
probably been distinguished by lack of communication.
(T11)
I don’t think we do that very well at all…I think the answer 
would have to be no. (T19)
Well, we produce an annual report [for] all members and 
when we put a statement in about SRI we did publish 
what the SRI was; we don’t routinely put that statement 
in every year but I mean over the years, we have kind of 
told them what out policy is and that’s all. (T2)
This lack of communication does not indicate a high level 
of accountability flowing from pension funds to their 
members. From the largest fund’s trustee there was, 
however, evidence of accountability to members:
without having a kind of fetish about communication…I 
still think we should improve it and we are gradually 
making improvements but like all of these things there’s 
a learning curve…but I think we probably give more 
information than most pension schemes do. I think we 
genuinely do try to be as open as possible. I’m not at all 
sure we actually achieve that…as a general principle we 
go for transparency not only from the companies in which 
we invest but we want our own actions to be transparent 
as well. (T9, emphasis added)
Nonetheless, even though this trustee seemed to be an 
outlier, representing best practice, his fund still has a long 
way to go in the area of communication. This quote also 
suggests that pension funds need to become learning 
organisations regarding climate change (Argyris 1993).
There was a general indication from our interviewees that 
the reason there was so little communication with 
members was lack of demand from them: 
I mean I can only remember in the last ten years maybe 
three or four people who’ve asked us what our SRI policy 
is but I don’t remember any of them making any 
comment once they received it, other than it wasn’t a 
particularly dynamic one. (T2)
To my knowledge, we’ve never received requests from 
members. We would respond by disclosing more generally; 
the fact that there has been silence from the members 
indicates that there is no particular desire on their part to 
have more detailed information in that area. (T7)
I would think there’s probably nobody who ever asks to 
see it…a long queue of people banging at the door asking 
to see this policy? No. (T8)
To be quite frank, we have not had any pressure 
whatsoever from members on…climate change issues. (T9)
When asked whether they received feedback from 
members on the implementation and effectiveness of their 
responsible investment policy, only one trustee said that 
they did: ‘Yes we do…if the fund managers aren’t doing 
very well we get told – people complain’ (T6). The rest of 
the interviewees said they did not, or that they were not 
aware of any feedback, with one commenting: ‘There’s a 
degree of cynicism in the world…the only questions we’re 
asked are about the fund’s ability to pay pensions’ (T18). 
In addition, we asked the trustees if they ever consulted 
the pension fund members in setting their responsible 
investment policy: only one of them did.
Although it should be reasonable to expect that 
institutional investors be accountable to their members, a 
number of reasons have been proffered in the literature for 
why this does not necessarily happen in practice: 
most individuals are simply unaware that it is their •	
money that institutional investors are investing
many individuals have not been too concerned about •	
how their investments are managed
‘institutional investors have traditionally been very •	
resistant to any interference in their investment 
decisions’ (Hildyard and Mansley 2001).
Our findings seem to support such suggestions that there 
are inherent obstacles to the accountability of the financial 
services to members. Overall, the interviews indicated that 
there was a low level of accountability in the relationship 
between fund managers and trustees, as well as directly 
between trustees and the pension fund members. This 
would suggest that the chains of accountability between 
pension funds and their members are not strong. This 
supports previous suggestions that there is a governance 
vacuum in pension fund investment (NAPF 2005).
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(Iv) obsTACles To TRUsTees’ ConsIdeRATIon oF 
ClImATe ChAnge
In this section we consider the obstacles that our 
interviewees perceived to their consideration of climate 
change in their role as trustees. These obstacles included: 
a lack of knowledge and understanding of the financial •	
impact of climate change
a lack of reliable data and evidence on the potential •	
impact of climate change on the pension fund industry
the difficulties in obtaining a consensus from members •	
on climate change issues
the problems associated with trustees being •	
overloaded in their duties, and 
lack of guidance from sponsor companies and trustees’ •	
advisers. 
These themes, derived from analysis of the interview data, 
are summarised in Fig. 4.1.
lack of knowledge concerning the financial impact of 
climate change
The trustees we interviewed claimed that they had 
inadequate knowledge of the links between climate change 
and pension fund performance, and indicated that their 
understanding of climate change impacts was inadequate. 
In response to a question asking: ‘What obstacles do you 
believe may be limiting your ability to take climate change 
impact into consideration in the pension fund?’, trustees 
gave the following answers.
I think basically it’s probably just a lack of awareness 
and a lack of knowledge of the issue. I mean maybe if 
we asked our investment adviser to talk about it with us, 
assuming that they’re on the case on the climate change 
issue, we’d understand better what the possible 
implications could be and could consider whether any 
action would be appropriate. (T8, emphasis added)
Lack of knowledge and information probably is one 
major factor in the wider view on climate change…I feel I 
haven’t got the information to tackle these things and 
maybe some of it is actually out there and just kind of 
passing me by. (T2, emphasis added)
Figure 4.1: obstacles to trustees’ ability to consider climate change
lACk oF TIme
Trustees too busy and •	
lack time to consider 
climate change
lACk oF knowledge 
And InFoRmATIon
Lack of knowledge •	
among trustees about 
climate change impacts 
on fund
Lack of evidence of •	
impact of climate 
change on pension 
funds
Lack of reliable data on •	
climate change impacts
Fear of being first•	
lACk oF gUIdAnCe
Trustees feel there is a •	
lack of guidance on 
climate change issues 
from the sponsor 
companies
Trustees feel there is a •	
lack of guidance on 
climate change issues 
from their advisers
Trustees perceive lack •	
of guidance from 
members, as it is 
difficult to achieve 
consensus on climate 
change among them
lACk oF ClARITy  
on lInk beTween 
ClImATe ChAnge And 
shAReholdeR vAlUe
Trustees do not •	
connect climate change 
and financial return in 
pension fund
Trustees perceive •	
fiduciary duty as a 
block, as they think 
considering climate 
change is inconsistent 
with maximising 
returns for the fund
Trustees do not •	
understand that 
considering climate 
change does not 
necessarily involve 
screening but can 
involve engagement 
only
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Lack of information, lack of interest and it’s an area 
that just hasn’t ever been flagged. (T5, emphasis added)
…knowledge of what activity is impacting on climate 
change so there’s obviously that element and a lack of 
knowledge. (T3, emphasis added)
It was clear throughout the interviews that one of the main 
reasons why trustees were not taking climate change into 
account in a systematic way was their lack of 
understanding of its potential financial impact. 
For the pension fund…well I think the honest answer is to 
say that we’ve yet to make that connection. (T10, 
emphasis added)
Well, even starting to make those connections and 
understanding…it’s a big…concept. (T10, emphasis 
added)
The penny hasn’t really dropped. (T10)
One trustee explained that this lack of knowledge and 
understanding was not, however, restricted to the trustee 
community.
I think climate change, unless all the scientists in the 
world are wrong and we’re all just being sort of 
brainwashed by the media…is a real issue but nobody 
really knows what effect it’s really going to have in the 
future and particularly the long-term future and nobody is 
certain how governments are going to react and deal with 
climate change; all these things are very unpredictable 
and scientists don’t understand it well enough yet so 
to predict how climate change could affect companies’ 
performance and equity returns…whether it’s going to 
be really at all material on economic grounds and 
equities and so on. It may be pretty immaterial but it 
may be very material and it’s hard to say. (T8, emphasis 
added)
Trustees’ views of their own ignorance were supported by 
their evident lack of knowledge regarding existing 
evidence. We asked the trustees if they were aware of 
several relevant publications. Their responses are 
displayed in Table 4.1 below and suggest a general lack of 
awareness of the reports. This contrasts with the findings 
of the UKSIF (2007) report, which suggest that the 
majority of trustees were believed to be aware of major 
climate change initiatives, especially The Stern Review 
(2006). 
Table 4.1: Are trustees aware of existing reports and 
studies on climate change and pension fund investment? 
Yes No
Responsible Investment in Focus: How Leading 
Public Pension Funds are Meeting the 
Challenge (UNEPFI and UKSIF 2007) 3 17
The Association of British Insurers Guidelines 
on Responsible Investment  
(ABI 2007) 6 14
The Stern Review: The Economics of Climate 
Change (Stern 2006) 11 9
Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI 
Initiative 2006). 2 18
Responsible Investment Trustee Toolkit (Higgs 
and Wildsmith 2005). 2 18
Eurosif European SRI Study (Eurosif 2006) 2 18
Climate Change and Shareholder Value 
(Carbon Trust 2006) 2 18
A Legal Framework for the Integration of 
Environmental, Social and Governance Issues 
into Institutional Investment (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005) 3 17
A Climate for Change: A Trustee’s Guide to 
Understanding and Addressing Climate Risk 
(Carbon Trust 2005) 1 19
Potentially Material Social, Ethical and 
Environmental Risks by Industry Sector for 
Pension Fund Trustees (Just Pensions 2005). 2 18
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There were various comments on The Stern Review, which 
has been discussed widely in the global media.
Definitely heard of it [Stern] and in fact I picked it up in a 
bookshop and flicked through it and it’s a very, very 
comprehensive document but I’ve never read it, and I 
don’t even have a copy, but it’s the sort of thing I’d 
actually like to read because I’m actually genuinely 
interested in the subject. (T8)
I’m aware of it in terms of following it in the news…and 
the reaction…becoming a little bit of a political football…
but again I’ve never actually read the document itself. 
(T10)
Now, I’ve heard of The Stern Review, um, but actually not 
in connection with…um…oh, it might have been in 
connection with pensions, I might be telling a lie there, 
but I’ve heard it referred to but I’ve never really looked at 
it. (T18)
Even where trustees had heard of reports, they did not 
make the connection with pensions, indicating a significant 
‘missing link’. The broad lack of knowledge displayed in 
Table 4.1 is particularly surprising given that some of these 
reports were aimed specifically at the trustee community. 
Another interviewee commented in relation to A Climate for 
Change: A Trustees’ Guide to Understanding and Addressing 
Climate Risk: ‘No, but that’s the sort of heading document 
that seems to be reasonably user friendly and we should 
be reading’ (T3).
lack of evidence, lack of reliable data, difficult to quantify
Many interviewees blamed a dearth of evidence for their 
lack of involvement in actively incorporating climate 
change into their portfolios:
It’s very difficult to try and evaluate that [climate change] 
in any numeric form. (T13)
One [obstacle] is the lack of reliable data; what benefit 
does climate change investing have on the future 
performance of the fund – and certainly reliable data is 
an issue. (T13)
The other thing is we don’t believe it’s yet proven that 
responsible investing…does actually bring a beneficial 
financial reward to the scheme. (T13)
difficulties in obtaining a consensus from members on 
climate change
The trustees we interviewed claimed that obtaining a 
consensus view on climate change was difficult, if not 
impossible:
How do you decide what the overall view of 15,000 
people is? You know you’ve got a complete spectrum of 
people who are out-and-out ‘green nuts’ to out-and-out 
people who deny climate change is even happening, so it 
makes it quite hard to go either way really. (T2)
We had an exciting event every year called the members 
AGM and from 10,000 members we used to get about 50 
people turning up…and they would stand up and say ‘you 
mustn’t invest in tobacco companies’ or ‘you must invest 
in…’ something else. And of course you have as many 
different points of view in the room as you have people…
and in the end you can’t do anything about any of it. 
(T14)
We shouldn’t spend more than half an hour [on climate 
change] at a trustee meeting…it’s very inadvisable to 
have an open debate because…people…will talk about 
egg production where half the chicks are liquidised…that 
kind of debate can easily occupy a day, if you let it. (T18)
Although Freshfields Brickhaus Deringer (2005) states that 
a consensus demand from pension fund members would 
force SEE issues to be a fiduciary duty for trustees, such a 
demand does not seem to be forthcoming.
lack of guidance from trustees’ advisers
Some trustees commented that there was a lack of 
guidance on climate change from their plan sponsor 
companies and from their advisers ‘and I think [there is] 
the lack of any particular message coming from any of the 
trustees’ advisers’ (T14).
This finding highlights a weak governance link in terms of 
trustees’ ability to obtain knowledge and advice necessary 
to fulfil their role. Some of the trustees mentioned that 
they would consult their investment advisers. Such 
consultation, however, demonstrates their reliance on 
third-party advice, which represents one of the constraints 
in the financial market. According to the Myners Review 
(2004), 80% of schemes at that time employed an 
investment consultant, with 53% of all schemes relying on 
a pool of just eight organisations. One implication is that 
the appointment of more competent trustees would help 
to overcome this weakness.20
lack of involvement with sponsor company
We asked trustees whether they engaged with the plan 
sponsor in implementing their responsible investment 
policy, and 13 said they did not. Our interviewees indicated 
that there might be a gap between what companies are 
doing on climate change and what their pension fund 
trustees are doing. The HeadLand Report (2007) stated 
that companies should be instructing their pension fund 
trustees to adopt a similar green approach to their own, 
but our evidence suggested this was not happening in 
practice. One trustee bemoaned: ‘the lack of any particular 
direction from the company...that is not a criticism of the 
company, it’s just a statement of fact’ (T14).
Evidence of a gap was suggested: ‘whatever we think is 
acceptable…our company has a sustainability policy and a 
very strong ethics policy. That doesn’t necessarily apply to 
20.  Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for raising this 
point.
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the pensions scheme because we’ve got other peoples’ 
money and unless we have a remit from them which I 
can’t imagine how it would be agreed [sic]’ (T16).
One trustee provided a possible explanation for why the 
sponsor companies were not engaging on SRI issues with 
their pension fund: ‘Nowadays, I have to say, in common 
with most pension schemes, the representation of the plan 
sponsor in terms of numbers is the same but the actual 
seniority of the individual is less than was the case 
before…’ (T11)
Of the seven trustees who said they did engage with their 
plan’s sponsors, one commented: ‘Yes…the company has 
a social and environmental policy about child labour and 
pollution and so on and we align ourselves with that and 
possibly even a step further’. (T18)
Even where trustees talked of engagement with the plan 
sponsor, there was no evidence of aligning the company’s 
sustainability policies with the fund’s responsible 
investment strategy: 
the plan sponsor is there in the trustee body and from 
time to time the chairman of the trustee body, who is also 
the non-executive part-time chairman of the company, 
does have to, so to speak, remove his trustee’s hat and 
say ‘let me for the moment speak on behalf of the 
company’. So there is, if you like, a continuous dialogue 
which I think works quite well…but again I have to say, in 
my experience, the company has not input into that 
dialogue any particular point of view that has a link 
with its own policies on matters like this…they certainly 
haven’t tried to, in any sense, lean on the trustees either 
to do things or not to do things. (T14, emphasis added)
Trustees view climate change as a subjective, not 
objective, issue
Our interviewees seemed to perceive climate change as a 
personal, moral issue rather than as an issue which should 
be applied objectively to their pension fund. One trustee 
identified confusion over a personal or an organisational 
response to climate change:
my view is that the primary responsibility of a trustee is to 
the members and irrespective of my personal feelings 
regarding climate change, in the capacity as a trustee, 
the priority is to protect the assets of the members and to 
protect their future benefits and I’m not convinced that I 
should impose my own judgements as to what I believe 
to be ethically correct to the extent that might prejudice 
the role of custodian and guardian that goes with being a 
trustee. (T7, emphasis added)
Another trustee identified a conflict between personal and 
organisational views: 
we don’t believe it’s our role as fiduciaries to introduce 
our own behavioural biases as to what they may or may 
not invest in…you’re going straight into the individual 
views and opinions and subjective views of individual 
trustees…it’s not our place to dictate to managers what 
they should do. (T12, emphasis added)
Confusing personal ethics with a need to address climate 
change on a financial basis seems to impede trustees in 
embracing a role in climate change: 
this is where the individual trustees might say, ‘I saw 
something in the news last night about such and such’, 
or, ‘I think wind farms are a great thing for the future – 
you know we could have something in our portfolio with 
wind farms in it’…we wouldn’t do that. (T12, emphasis 
added)
Abnormal returns
Some trustees commented that it was not possible to 
make abnormal returns by taking account of climate 
change issues because the data were too visible:
the way our managers are expected to execute our 
beliefs…trying to buy into things that the rest of the 
market have missed…or…have over-exaggerated, so to 
the extent that climate change, as politicians and others 
are latching onto it…it’s intended to be more 
transparent…I’m not sure how that works because [if] it 
means that Trucost reports are available to everybody, 
then it probably means…the performance potential is 
limited. (T12)
This argument does not, however, consider that for long-
term investment in companies you need to ensure that 
they are managing their climate change risk strategically.
some trustees are sceptical about climate change
There was evidence of a degree of scepticism among 
members of the trustee community about the validity of 
global warming and climate change arguments: 
the effect of climate change and ascribing it to an event 
is kind of tricky anyway…are there more hurricanes 
disrupting transport and oil production as a result of 
climate change or was it going to happen anyway? (T18, 
emphasis added)
I find the emotional aspects of it are usually well 
presented and documented but it remains very subjective 
and I guess I’m a hard-nosed accountant who wants to 
see the numbers. (T11, emphasis added)
I think that you will find that there will probably be some 
colleagues on the trustee board that don’t buy into the 
issue of global warming, that they think it’s a bit of a 
con and they’ve got their own personal opinions about 
that. (T15, emphasis added)
I would be very sceptical at this stage and I know 
people are putting a lot of work into this, which is all to 
the good because clearly work should be done in this 
area; but I think it’s incredibly difficult to really predict 
what it’s going to mean. (T8, emphasis added)
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I think I might be one of the sceptics for the time being. 
I’m not saying that pollution is good, obviously not, but 
I’m not sure I can agree with what is being made of 
climate change. (T17, emphasis added)
Some of these comments mirror the sceptical views 
encapsulated in a small body of academic literature 
discussed earlier (for example, Carter et al. 2006; Carter 
2007; Robinson 2008).
Trustees too busy with other responsibilities
Another obstacle identified by trustees was a sense that 
their role encompassed an increasing array of 
responsibilities, rendering climate change a less significant 
consideration than others under their remit. 
I think it’s something [climate change] that with all the 
other changes, and this sounds pathetic, but with all the 
other things that have been going on in the pensions 
world over the last few years, it’s just got pushed down 
the pile. (T2, emphasis added)
You are trying to do what you need to do to protect your 
assets and when you start onto things like this [climate 
change], they are nice to have and nice to be involved with, 
and until somebody really comes along and says, ‘right 
you really need to start thinking about this’, you don’t, 
because there’s just so much regulation to get involved 
with and to keep up with, that anything else beyond 
that is wishful thinking right now. (T5, emphasis added)
Myners (2001) focuses on the role of the trustees, 
highlighting the need for them to become more engaged 
in pension fund investment generally. Indeed, the Myners 
Review (2004) highlights the small amount of time devoted 
to trusteeship, with the average being 10.6 hours per year 
in board meetings. Myners’ criticisms (2001) have had 
some positive impact on the trustee community, although 
as the Myners Review (2004) shows, there is still room for 
improvement. Further, Myners (2001) does not address 
social and environmental responsibilities. It seems that this 
is an area that has been ignored by trustees in their quest 
to improve their performance and effectiveness, given time 
constraints.
sRI perceived as screening, not engagement
Another obstacle to trustees’ consideration of climate 
change within their remit may be attributed to their 
insufficient understanding of SRI strategy. The interviewees 
generally interpreted SRI strategy as screening, not 
engagement, suggesting an outdated understanding, 
because a ‘best in sector’ approach superseded negative 
(and positive) screening several years ago (Solomon 2007). 
Some interviewees clearly had no conception of any 
positive relationship between SRI and financial return, 
The idea that small contributions will win the day is just 
rubbish and therefore it’s no good our members retiring 
on a smaller pension because our scheme didn’t invest to 
maximise its profits when another scheme does, [it] 
doesn’t benefit them, so we can’t take climate change 
into account’. (T4)
Clearly, taking account of climate change in institutional 
investment does not require a negative screening 
approach and active fund management can affect 
corporate behaviour in relation to climate change. This 
seems to be an area where awareness of current strategies 
and approaches would benefit the trustee community.
Fear of being first
Another impediment identified by the leaders among the 
interviewees was a fear of being first: ‘I think within the 
sector there’s a natural reluctance to be the first person…
because there’s a lack of confidence that everybody else is 
going to do it’ (T9). This type of attitude is indicative of a 
defensive strategy, a barrier created by trustees to avoid 
changing the status quo (Argyris 1993). It also reflects the 
finding of the UNEP, discussed earlier, that a sense of 
shared responsibility may deter the group from taking the 
initiative. Fear of being first has traditionally been a 
problem in financial markets, which are frequently 
characterised by ‘herding’ behaviour. For example, Guyatt 
(2005) explains that prevailing dominant conventions 
(short-termism, gravitation towards defensible decisions 
and reluctance to incorporate corporate responsibility 
factors into the core investment process), reinforced by 
institutional herding tendencies, represent behavioural 
obstacles to responsible investing. Our evidence suggests 
that the same sort of herding behaviour is blocking trustee 
activism in the area of climate change.
(v) TRUsTees’ ATTITUdes TowARds TheIR FUTURe 
Role In ClImATe ChAnge
In this section we consider a series of aspects raised by 
trustees regarding their perceptions of their role and 
responsibilities in relation to climate change in the future. 
Specifically, we consider: 
whether trustees believed that climate change would •	
grow in importance
whether they believed they could improve their conduct •	
in the area of climate change
how they claimed they should be responding to the •	
‘challenge’ posed by climate change
the extent to which trustees considered they have a •	
potential to influence corporate behaviour, and
some reflections on how this research project could •	
affect their attitudes towards their role regarding 
climate change. 
Interestingly, this section provides suggestions from 
trustees on the way forward for them in relation to climate 
change.
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Climate change will grow in importance for pension funds
Although there was little evidence to suggest that climate 
change issues were viewed as an important consideration 
by trustees at present, there was a general belief among 
our interviewees that this situation would change in the 
future. As we saw earlier, some interviewees believed 
climate change could have a material impact over the long 
term. Nonetheless, this view tended to be qualified by the 
perception that climate change factors would not become 
material for many years (even decades) and that in the 
short-to-medium term they were not material, but that this 
may change over time:
there will be long-term economic changes and that will 
have a degree of impact on the [pension fund] industry 
itself. (T7, emphasis added)
Those are extremes that we’re not feeling in the UK yet 
and I don’t suppose we will, certainly not in our 
lifetime…I find it hard to see within the next 20 to 30 
years really. (T2, emphasis added)
Well, given I said that we take no regard to it because it’s 
in conflict with the members’ interest, I think over time 
we will have to have, and be seen to have, policies that 
members will…ask for, but that’s not currently the case. 
(T4, emphasis added)
Right now I don’t [think that climate change is an 
important factor affecting financial return and shareholder 
value]…but I think in the future, probably the next three 
to five years, maybe even two to five years, then I think 
it will become an issue. (T5, emphasis added)
I think members will increasingly be more aware of 
climate change and may ask the pension trustees what 
their policies are doing with climate change. (T6)
I think it’s really hard to say at the moment…so I would 
say at the moment not a lot, but that view could easily 
change in the next six months or couple of years…I 
would think that, where we are today, it is very difficult to 
really appreciate the scale of this and it will become clearer. 
I think it will become clearer over the years going forward 
rather than right now, because I just don’t…certainly in a 
fund my size, I don’t see what the impact is on the funds 
but I’m going to check up because you’ve raised it with 
me [laughs]…but I’m not seeing it as a kind of flashing 
light at this stage and maybe I’m wrong; I’m quite 
prepared to accept that I could be wrong but I think it will 
become an issue over time, I think it’s bound to, but how 
big it’s going to be, I don’t know. (T8, emphasis added)
Well pensions are one of the biggest investors in the 
stock market, aren’t they, and climate change is going to 
impact enormously on businesses around the world, so 
it’s going to affect a lot of companies individually: it’s 
going to affect their dividends and stock value, which is 
the life blood of pension funds isn’t it?…next time we’re 
appointing our fund managers…it [climate change] will 
be a much bigger consideration than it was last time. 
(T11)
Trustees acknowledge room for improvement
We asked our interviewees whether they thought that the 
consideration of climate change in their pension fund’s 
investment strategy could be improved, in order to gain an 
insight into possible future policy recommendations from 
the trustee community themselves. Thirteen of the 
trustees we interviewed believed that the consideration of 
climate change in their pension fund’s investment strategy 
could be improved, with the rest saying they were unsure, 
‘…we need to monitor and record some of those 
conversations more clearly now’ (T3).
Things can always be improved, yes. We could be more 
active: whether it would produce any impact on the 
companies in which we invest, I’m not sure. (T2, 
emphasis added)
I think more briefing notes from organisations such as 
the PMI and other outfits as well as our investment 
managers advising us, so I think education and knowledge 
are important. Discussing it [climate change] on a regular 
basis at trustees’ meetings needs to have a disciplined, 
timetabled element to it. (T3, emphasis added)
I think from the conversation we’ve had, we really need to 
start, probably, considering the whole social responsibility 
thing from the start. So I think it’s fairly basic we just 
even begin to give it some thought and to start making 
sure that when we start seeing these funds come up, we 
ensure that we’re in there. (T5)
I think what we could do on our fund is to at least have it 
on our agenda and to ask our investment advisers to 
give us some advice or give a presentation or have a 
discussion point at a future meeting of the trustees. (T8, 
emphasis added)
I’m going to talk to our investment advisers. (T8)
Two trustees answered with a definite ‘no’: ‘I don’t think it 
needs improving…I think it’s appropriate to the current 
situation’ (T18).
how trustees say they should be responding to the 
climate change challenge
We asked the trustees specifically how they thought they 
should be responding to the climate change challenge. The 
responses were quite mixed. Summarising their general 
views, six were quite negative about the need for them to 
play a role in encouraging the consideration of climate 
change within their pension funds. Five were positive, 
indicating that they saw it as an important element of their 
socially responsible investment strategy. Three trustees 
said that it was too early to tell and the rest were generally 
unsure. Most said that they should be responding in some 
way, for example: 
We should be trying to monitor any issues…and we 
probably should have on our horizon that we should be 
thinking more about investing in responsible companies, 
responsible in relation to climate change. (T2, emphasis 
added)
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I think as part of four or five socially responsible policies, 
we should be discussing it with our advisers, asking 
questions of the fund managers, and once a year having a 
discussion on it as trustees and recording those 
statements. (T3)
It’s probably something that’s worth discussing with 
fellow trustees to see whether we believe we need to look 
at our investments or whether we should have a mandate 
with our fund managers to say, ‘here is a list of 
companies we don’t wish to invest in, if they are abusers 
of the environment’. (T5)
Trustees’ potential to affect corporate behaviour on 
climate change
We asked the trustees whether they considered that in 
their role as trustees the approach they adopted towards 
climate change could potentially affect corporate 
behaviour. Nine trustees said that it could, six said that it 
could not. The others did not express a definite view. 
Trustees who said that they could influence corporate 
behaviour provided reasons why: ‘Oh yeah…I think if 
corporates believe their stock is being shunned then I think 
they’d take action’ (T6).
We could influence core tactics…if we had an ethics 
policy where climate change came more to the fore…
then that might reflect on the pension fund. (T4)
I mean in principle trustees as a body, you know all 
trustees or all pension funds clearly have a massive 
ability to impact. Whether they will do is another 
question because trustees are often a fairly passive group 
of people that really don’t sort of punch their weight but 
in theory they could have a big impact, yeah. (T8, 
emphasis added)
Umm, it could do, I suppose, in the likes of the third world 
and what have you. If you can stop people emitting a 
huge amount of carbon out of factories, and what have 
you, yeah, I suppose you could. (T1)
Where there’s money the answer would probably be that 
it could…I don’t think we’re taking any kind of action 
which would influence corporate behaviour, but I think if 
enough people said we’re not investing…then obviously it 
could have that effect. (T18, emphasis original)
We don’t see that the corporates are just there to do as 
they wish without reference…to the shareholders…what 
we want to do is have that dialogue with those companies 
over strategic direction. (T9)
There’s a lot of investment powers…and a concerted 
move could pressurise management boards of 
companies. (T17)
One trustee explained in detail how the impact could arise:
[There are a] couple of levels, one is the mandate that 
we have through investing in a number of very large 
companies [and] then there’s the pension opportunity for 
us to be kind of held up as a role model for how big 
pension scheme governance looks…so I think on both 
those levels we’ve got significant opportunity to influence 
other trustee bodies as well as companies. (T10)
Another trustee, from a large pension fund, also explained 
that they could probably affect corporate behaviour on 
climate change, although this trustee seemed unclear 
about the mechanism by which this would happen: ‘by 
using our influence we can probably influence companies 
to perhaps change their policies on their carbon footprint, 
so I think that is something we could probably do. Now I 
might be naive here but it is certainly worth a try, in my 
opinion’ (T15). From the interviewee who represented a 
leader in the field, there was evidence of accountability to 
members in this area, ‘what we’re doing is looking at how 
we can influence the behaviour of…the top six UK carbon 
emitters…’ (T9).
Overall, the majority gave the impression that there was a 
latent potential for change, which could be mobilised. 
Those who were unsure about their potential impact 
seemed to think there was a time factor involved, with 
climate change becoming more significant in the future, 
thereby making their potential impact more significant in 
this area: ‘I’d like to think that we could have some impact 
on companies’ investment policies and investments but I 
think at this point in time our impact is minimal’ (T13).
government or free market solution?
There were some suggestions from interviewees about 
how climate change may be tackled in a broader context. 
There was a suggestion from interviewees that the 
government, not just national but international, should play 
a more dominant role in the area of climate change.
My key point…is that it’s in the ‘it’s not the law yet 
therefore we don’t have to do it’ category…I think it’s 
changing and I recognise that there will be more and 
more pressure put on trustees…it’s immensely complex 
and I think it needs…the world government treatment…I 
used to buy the Eagle [comic] when I was a child and 
there were dreams of a world government. (T18)
This suggests a utopian vision for the future and for 
dealing with climate change, in direct contrast to 
suggestions that the market will deal with it, probably 
adequately, without government intervention (Robinson 
2008). Alternatively, another interviewee indicated that 
legislation would not be an appropriate route even though 
he thought that government intervention was necessary, as 
the market had failed, but that a voluntary framework set 
up by government was preferable to regulation of any sort:
People like governments and regulators…and 
politicians…what they do in terms of climate change is 
going to be absolutely critical…they’re the people who 
are going to have to set the framework…it would be very 
useful for governments to play an encouraging role…I 
would like…to try and minimise the enforcement or the 
compulsory regulatory approach by government…a 
supportive framework is much more important…
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voluntary codes I’m all for, I don’t mind the government 
setting the framework, but I think it’s much more 
important for the government to try and put its own 
house in order first. (T9, emphasis added)
Research alters trustees’ world views
There was no evidence to suggest that the trustees we 
interviewed treated climate change with insincerity or in a 
light-hearted way. Although it was clear they were not 
conversant with the issues, on the whole, and did not 
generally understand their role in climate change, they 
displayed a serious attitude towards the issues. They 
clearly believed that they needed to know more and to 
understand how they should be responding. They made 
suggestions as to how they could improve in the area and 
what they should be doing in the future. Their intentions to 
alter their role in climate change by changing their 
behaviour are summarised in Fig. 4.2. 
The trustees were generally quite humble about their lack 
of knowledge and expressed concern. From a 
methodological viewpoint, these findings are significant as 
they show how the research process influenced trustees’ 
world views in relation to climate change. Their views 
about their role in relation to climate change were 
distinctly different by the end of the interview. Whether 
these changes in attitude will lead to changes in behaviour 
and approach that are genuine and lasting remains to be 
seen. This can be tested by further research, as depicted 
in Fig. 3.1 (see page 20). Nonetheless, at this stage of the 
research, the trustees interviewed treated climate change 
with gravitas and, in some cases, by the end of the 
interviews they were unsettled about their lack of 
knowledge, where this had become obvious throughout the 
interview.
Figure 4.2: Impact of the research – trustees alter their role in climate change
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Well, I don’t think we are ignorant or dismissive of 
climate change…but I’m not sure we’re anywhere near 
the forefront and I think it would be highlighted more if 
we were [more] knowledgeable...of the individual 
businesses that our money is being invested in, and I 
think if we incorporated those sort of questions when 
we’re reviewing with our fund managers more, then I 
think we would be up there with the better trustee boards 
in terms of climate change and other social issues. (T3, 
emphasis added)
Trustees seemed perturbed by the questions in the 
interviews. When asked at the end of the interview if they 
believed that there were any issues that should be 
mentioned, and asked for their observations and 
comments, most of them indicated a sense of unease 
about their lack of engagement with the issue of climate 
change in relation to their duties as trustees. They also 
expressed concerns as to whether they were outliers or 
whether other trustees would give similar views.
I mean I suppose it leaves me feeling a bit as if I’ve got 
my head in the sand about these things. I mean I’ve 
said no to an awful lot of things. Now whether that will 
turn out to be true for everybody or not is really what I’m 
most interested in seeing in the report. You’ve gone 
through a whole heap of things there and I’m thinking 
‘Oh, not doing that’, ‘Never heard of that’, and whether 
we should or not is then a follow-on. (T2, emphasis added)
Well, I think from this conversation we’ve had, I mean, I 
will be going back to our chairman and saying, ‘look, 
there are probably six areas that we have to be’ – well, I 
would use the words ‘socially responsible as trustees’, 
and I think we would obviously share that with members 
and I’m sure members would support us, the majority 
anyway. (T3, emphasis added)
It’s actually quite good because you think, well, you take 
part in a survey, but I’m sat thinking, mm, [laughs] OK, 
we need to do something. (T5)
It’s been quite an eye-opener, I must admit, so it will be 
quite interesting to read the report…I hope it [my 
response] is of use, even if it is proof that we are totally 
heathens. (T5, emphasis added)
In fact I’ll make a note…I will discuss this with our 
investment advisers, whether this [climate change] is 
something we might usefully do and whether other 
pension funds are having this kind of debate. (T8)
In terms of the actual SRI policy...we’ve yet to have a 
conversation around that but the fact that I’m taking part 
in this interview…this is a very helpful trigger for me to 
[raise it] at one of our next meetings. (T10, emphasis 
added)
…participating in this research…it’s an opportunity again 
for me to step back and think, ‘am I missing something 
here, am I blind to something here, am I prejudiced 
here?’. (T11, emphasis added)
It’s been a bit of an eye-opener. (T17, emphasis added)
Some uncomfortable thoughts, which isn’t a bad thing, 
that maybe how perhaps hiding behind a tracker and not 
actually grasping the nettle is more comfortable for 
us…Again following this conversation I’ll try and make it 
higher [priority] than it has been. (T19, emphasis 
added)
I guess…this will stimulate discussion and thinking and 
an appreciation among trustee boards of the importance 
of climate change. (T10, emphasis added) 
There was also an emotional response about their lack of 
involvement in climate change within their role: 
I feel guilty that I ought to be doing a lot more. (T16, 
emphasis added)
(vI) dIsCRImInAnT AnAlysIs: A sIze eFFeCT In 
TRUsTees’ ATTITUdes
The interview data were analysed according to pension 
fund size (measured by both number of members and 
asset value) in order to detect any significant differences in 
trustees’ views towards their role and responsibilities in 
relation to climate change. Some evidence of a size effect 
emerged from the analysis and from the interviewees’ 
comments: ‘we probably are more conscious of climate 
change than most other funds…because we are a very 
large fund’ (T9, emphasis added). Trustees from larger 
funds were generally more knowledgeable, with the 
significant outlier (trustee 9) being from the largest fund in 
the sample: ‘the big schemes have got more resource, 
more money, more manpower to be able to do some of the 
thinking and some of the work that’s necessary’ (T9, 
emphasis added).
This finding is consistent with Solomon and Solomon 
(2006), who present evidence of a significant size factor in 
private dialogue and engagement by institutional investors 
with their investee companies on SEE issues. In addition, 
trustees from larger funds seemed to have more 
engagement with their plan sponsor on climate change 
issues than the smaller funds. Indeed, trustees from 
smaller funds commented that they did not have the 
ability, because of their size, to instruct their fund 
managers: ‘A small pension scheme simply has no scope 
to do that…we expect [the fund manager] to behave 
responsibly in a whole variety of ways, in relation to its 
holdings, but we can’t tell them how to do it, so to speak 
(T14, emphasis added).
The difference here between larger and smaller funds is 
not surprising, given the greater resources available to 
trustees from larger funds as well as the greater sense of 
responsibility they may have, as well as the larger number 
of members relying on them.
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Given that there is readily available literature on the 
relevance of climate change to institutional investment, 
especially pension funds and insurance companies, our 
interviews suggested a substantial gap between ‘theory 
and practice’. In theory, according to the recommendations 
of various published documents (for example, Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2005; Carbon Trust 2005) trustees 
should be including climate change issues in their role and 
responsibilities, ensuring that the fund managers are 
considering these issues in the portfolio investment. In 
spite of existing recommendations, we found that trustees 
were generally unaware of their fund managers’ activities 
and policies in relation to climate change. Indeed, trustees’ 
lack of knowledge about their pension fund managers’ 
activism was not restricted to climate change issues: they 
had little idea of the process or outcome of engagement, 
dialogue and voting by their fund managers in any area. 
This contrasts with the recommendations of the Carbon 
Trust (2005) and Myners (2001). Our evidence does, 
however, support the findings of the Myners Review 
(2004), which criticises trustees for not engaging 
adequately with their fund managers on issues of 
shareholder activism. Given the strong credentials in terms 
of expertise and relevant qualifications that characterise 
our trustee sample, we cannot dismiss their overall lack of 
active involvement with their fund managers on the basis 
of their being under-qualified for their role. Given the 
trustees’ role as custodians of their members’ assets, such 
a dearth of knowledge and indeed, interest, in active 
management of the funds under their care is worrying. It 
implies a low level of accountability to pension fund 
members in an area of growing risk and concern for the 
financial services industry. 
These findings could have much broader and more serious 
implications for financial accountability. Given that the 
Myners Review (2004) found continuing weaknesses in 
many areas of trusteeship, our findings on climate change 
may simply represent a small piece of a much larger 
jigsaw, depicting an image of low trustee accountability to 
members through lack of interest and action.
Nonetheless, our findings suggest that trustees’ lack of 
engagement on climate change may reflect a lack of 
interest from pension fund members. We have 
summarised the many obstacles to trustees’ taking action 
on climate change in Fig. 4.1. These obstacles, grounded in 
the data, suggest that little progress has been made, in 
this area of the financial services industry, since the UNEP 
identified obstacles to the financial sector engaging with 
climate change in 2003 (Carbon Trust 2005).
TRUsTees’ ACCoUnTAbIlITy To membeRs In 
RelATIon To ClImATe ChAnge RIsk
We now present a diagrammatic model summarising the 
way in which responsibility and accountability flow 
between the various groups involved in pension fund 
investment, in relation to climate change risk. Fig. 5.1 
(page 36) shows that the accountability links flowing from 
companies to shareholders (in this case the pension fund 
members) through social and environmental reporting are 
relatively well-developed. The diagram indicates that this 
area of accountability has been well researched in the 
academic accounting literature. Nonetheless, the chains of 
accountability flowing between fund managers and the 
trustees who appoint them, and between fund managers 
and pension fund members have not been well 
researched. Little is known about the levels of 
accountability in these intermediary relationships.
The chains of accountability between trustees and their 
appointed pension fund managers and between trustees 
and their pension fund members are clearly weak, 
according to our interview evidence. Indeed, from the 
perspective of corporate governance and accountability in 
the financial service sector, these findings paint an 
uncomfortable image.
As mentioned above, a crucial question for financial 
services accountability is the extent to which these 
findings, specific to climate change factors, may be 
generalised to pension fund investment more broadly. To 
what extent are these evident gaps in accountability and 
governance between the various intermediaries in pension 
fund investment in relation to climate change reflected in 
relation to other qualitative, non-financial issues? To what 
extent may our findings be generalised to suggest that 
there are seriously low levels of accountability between 
trustees, fund managers, members and sponsor 
companies in relation to the whole gamut of ESG factors? 
Or even more worryingly, to what extent is this true across 
the whole gamut of material financial and non-financial 
issues? Although focusing their answers on climate change, 
the interviewees frequently referred to climate change as 
one aspect of ESG, and discussed their actions in relation 
to their SIPs generally. Further research is required to 
gauge the extent to which these gaps in accountability are 
evident in relation to other, more general factors.
There is also the issue of plan sponsor involvement (or lack 
of involvement) in the pension scheme and the gap 
between what the sponsor company is doing regarding 
climate change and what their pension fund is doing. The 
HeadLand report (2007) says they should be linked but we 
found little evidence for this. This is especially interesting 
given that some (at least four) of our interviewees were 
company-nominated. Perhaps the sponsor did not want 
trustees to take part, in order to hide this asymmetry 
– that could be a reason for the low response. Is it possible 
that companies do not want it to become public knowledge 
that their ‘green’ policies and strategies are not being 
transferred to their pension schemes? Is it possible that 
companies are blocking trustees’ participation in research? 
5. Concluding discussion
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The contrast we found between what companies are doing 
in relation to climate change and their pension funds’ 
activities can be interpreted at best as a lack of 
consistency in approach, but at worst as an illustration of 
hypocrisy.
Another issue raised in discussing these findings with 
colleagues was that if pension fund managers are dealing 
with climate change (and they are, according to evidence: 
Solomon and Solomon 2006) then does it matter that 
trustees are not conversant with climate change impacts 
and materiality? From an accountability perspective, it 
does matter. Trustees have a responsibility to be 
accountable to the pension fund members by keeping 
abreast of issues that could affect their pension fund. As 
outlined in the reports by the Carbon Trust (2005; 2006), 
trustees have a duty to understand potential climate 
change impacts on their fund and should instruct their 
fund managers to take climate change risk into account. 
They should not be ‘washing their hands’ of any 
responsibility in this area by simply delegating 
responsibility and decision making to fund managers. Yet, 
this is a theme arising from the interviews. The Myners 
Review (2004) emphasises the importance of trustees’ 
engagement with their fund managers across all areas of 
investment strategy. Climate change is just one of many 
areas where trustees should be dynamic and proactive in 
their accountability relationships. Further, trustees have a 
responsibility and duty to engage with the pension fund 
members to discuss the ways in which, inter alia, they are 
dealing with climate change risk.
PolICy ReCommendATIons
These findings suggest there may be a need, recognised 
by some of our interviewees, for raising awareness of the 
ways in which climate change may affect pension fund 
investment. The findings indicate that trustees may require 
clearer understanding of the way in which climate change 
risk can reduce financial returns and the ways in which 
assets may be protected from negative impacts. Given that 
trustees and fund managers within the pension fund 
industry have a tendency towards ‘short-termist’ 
strategies, it is important to raise awareness on two levels. 
First, trustees need to be encouraged to adopt a more 
long-term approach towards investment strategy, which 
they then relate to their fund managers. Secondly, the 
rapid manner in which climate change is moving from a 
long-term issue into the short-term concern, as scientific 
research indicates acceleration in the changes, needs to 
be conveyed quickly and forcibly to the investment 
community. 
Training for trustees in the area of climate change risks 
and opportunities represents another potential policy 
recommendation. The notion of trustees as non-specialist 
amateurs has been dispelled to some extent since Myners 
(2001) but has perhaps not been considered in the area of 
non-financial risks, such as climate change. Nonetheless, 
at the most basic level, trustees need to introduce climate 
change onto their agenda. Our findings suggest there is 
little or no discussion of climate change issues among 
trustees in meetings. A range of other suggestions made 
by the trustees, for action in relation to climate change, 
were summarised in Fig. 4.2 (see page 33). There is an 
urgent need for trustees to take a more proactive interest 
in the activities of their delegated fund managers, not just 
in relation to climate change but also across the whole 
gamut of material risks and opportunities that affect their 
pension funds.
Unless trustees confront the risks associated with climate 
change and gain a more detailed understanding of 
potential material impact on their pension funds, they 
could be ignoring a time bomb which, according to the 
latest evidence, may not explode in the short term but 
could affect the financial community in the medium to 
long term. In the 21st century, climate change is now a 
significant ‘non-financial’ risk factor requiring action from 
the financial services industry if accountability to 
shareholders and other stakeholders is to be discharged 
effectively. Trustees should be responding to the climate 
change challenge.
As a result of these findings, we make recommendations 
on two levels. First, on a theoretical and academic level, we 
suggest that there is an urgent need for further academic, 
but practitioner-led, research into the accountability and 
governance links between the intermediaries involved in 
pension fund investment, specifically between trustees and 
their pension fund members, their fund managers and 
their sponsor companies. This research, as well as 
examining these links across all areas of pension fund 
investment, should also focus on the accountability chains 
relating specifically to ESG issues. As well as 
acknowledging the material importance of ESG issues, 
further research may reveal whether the quality of ESG 
management in institutional investment represents a 
weather vane, or proxy, for the quality of management and 
accountability across all investment issues.
On a practical level, there is an urgent need for a code of 
practice, or at least a set of principles representing best 
practice, in accountability and governance for pension 
funds, and especially for the trustee community, with an 
emphasis on consideration of extra-financials. The Myners 
principles, although representing an important 
improvement to pension fund governance, did not focus on 
ESG accountability within the trustee community. These 
broader, ‘soft’, qualitative issues require attention by 
trustees and other members of the pension fund 
community. A code of best practice on governance and 
accountability aimed at trustees would help to resolve this 
situation. Further, and more radically, a code of best 
practice which emphasises material non-financial (extra-
financial) factors such as climate change, as well as 
financial factors, is overdue and is required urgently in 
order to drag these critical material issues into the 
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mainstream of institutional investment. Greater integration 
of climate change (and other material extra-financials) 
should, for trustees, involve the following developments:
integration of climate change issues into trustee •	
agendas for meetings
information being actively sought by trustees on the •	
potential material impacts of climate change factors on 
their fund, from investment consultants, advisers and 
other specialists
integration of climate change issues into strategy for •	
the fund
integration of climate change issues into the asset •	
allocation decision made by trustees
integration of climate change issues into the SIP and •	
responsible investment policy
integration of climate change issues into discussions •	
between trustees and their delegated pension fund 
managers (by implication, where such engagement is 
not occurring, trustees should be seeking to engage 
with fund managers on their investment style and 
activism on all relevant issues, not just in relation to 
climate change).
These recommendations echo, to a large extent, those 
made by the Carbon Trust (2005). The difference is that 
we recommend a formal code of practice to be developed 
and implemented for pension fund trustees, which 
encapsulates the above best-practice guidelines.
With all due respect to the Carbon Trust and other 
organisations that lobby on climate change issues, the 
indication from this report is that a code of practice should 
emanate from a more central, mainstream body: either the 
government or a collaboration of mainstream investment 
institutions. As with the codes of best practice for 
corporate governance, a code of practice for trustees on 
climate change needs to be given the highest stamp of 
authority. If this is not the case, there may be a temptation 
for trustees to view the code as a marginal, voluntary and 
unnecessary document. We are not proposing a 
mandatory code, but within a voluntary environment, a 
code of best practice on climate change needs to be 
authenticated and pushed by the mainstream institutions. 
Climate change is such a critical issue for the financial 
services industry, for the economy and for society as a 
whole, that there should be no problem obtaining support 
for a code of practice from the UK government and from 
major mainstream financial institutions.
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